

Vol. 2

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# The United States Senate

## Report of Proceedings

### Hearing held before

Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

of the Committee on Armed Services

and

Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences

INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,  
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

February 4, 1960

Washington, D. C.

**WARD & PAUL**

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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INVESTIGATION OF KEY ASPECTS OF SPACE,  
MISSILES AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Thursday, February 4, 1960

United States Senate,  
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the  
Committee on Armed Services, and  
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to recess,  
at 10:05 a.m., in Room 235, Old Senate Office Building,  
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (Chairman of the Committee and  
Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:  
Senators Johnson (Presiding), Stennis, and  
Saltonstall.

Present: Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:  
Senators Johnson (Presiding), Stennis, Cannon,  
Wiley, Martin, and Case (N.J.)

Also present: Senators Engle and Bush.

Edwin L. Weisl, Special Counsel; Cyrus R. Vance,  
Associate Counsel; Kenneth E. Belieu, Staff Director of  
Space Committee and Preparedness Subcommittee.

Staff Members, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:  
Stuart French, Associate Counsel.

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Staff Members, Committee on Aeronautical and Space  
Sciences: Max Lehrer, Assistant Staff Director; Everard H.  
Smith, Jr., Counsel; Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Chief Clerk; and  
Dr. Earl W. Lindvelt, Assistant Chief Clerk.

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The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. Today

General Maxwell Taylor, former Chief of Staff of the Army, now retired, will testify. He will be followed by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, current Chief of Staff of the Army, now retired, will testify. He will be followed by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, current Chief of Staff of the Army.

We in Congress have a very grave responsibility. The Constitution provides that Congress has the power to provide for the common defense and to raise and maintain military forces and establish the rules and regulations for the government thereof.

Congress can do this only if it gets timely and accurate information on which to base its decisions.

Each year Congress is requested to make decisions on the military programs submitted. On these decisions, good or bad, may well rest the fate of our Republic.

Congress must be candidly and fully advised by America's senior military officials; else it cannot act wisely.

Testimony taken to date indicates many differences of opinion among unquestionably patriotic and dedicated officials. Our Committee hopes -- at least in part -- to be able to resolve some of these issues.

However, on one thing we all agree. It is this. The decisions we make now - this year - will cast America's future. Upon these decisions will rest tomorrow's freedom of action.

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These decisions will not be taken lightly.

General Maxwell Taylor brings to the Committee a lifelong background as one of the world's outstanding professional soldiers. He most recently was Chief of Staff of the Army and a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He now appears before the Committee as a private citizen, beloved by all who know him and respected by the entire nation.

General Taylor, it is our custom to swear the witness. Will you stand and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in the testimony you are about to give, so help you God?

General Taylor. I do.

The Chairman. General Taylor, I want to personally thank you for taking your time to come and appear before this Committee. Normally it is our procedure to ask the counsel to begin the questioning. However, if you have any remarks or any prepared statement you would like to make and desire to make it first, we will be glad to follow your recommendation.

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## TESTIMONY OF GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

General Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a short prepared statement if it is agreeable that I read it.

The Chairman. Very well, proceed.

General Taylor. Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen:

I appreciate the invitation to appear before this joint committee and to express my personal views as a civilian on our national military posture. To present these views I do not intend to take the time of this committee with an elaborate prepared statement.

Many of you have heard my testimony on previous appearances as Chief of Staff of the Army, the position from which I retired on last June 30th. Perhaps some of you may have read something of my writings on military strategy since my retirement. In any case my views are of public knowledge and I am prepared to answer for them. However to provide a basis of departure for discussion, it may be useful to summarize the principal points of my case as follows:

a. Important changes have occurred since 1945, and particularly since 1953, which require a complete reappraisal of our national military policy. Such changes include the following.

(1) The placing of major reliance on weapons of massive destruction has lost all justification in view of Soviet progress in atomic weapons and long-range missiles. It did not keep

bd6      the peace when we had a complete monopoly of atomic weapons. It is obviously incapable of coping with the rising level of Communist provocation which is accompanying the rise in Soviet military strength.

(2) Meanwhile the trend of relative military strength is against us. Our manned bomber force is a dwindling asset. Our long-range missile force is limited in size, uncertain in reliability, and immobile upon exposed bases. We have no anti-missile defense in being or in sight. There is no effective fall out protection for our civil population .

(3) The foregoing conditions indicate a decline in our capability to deter deliberate general atomic war. This decline has been accompanied by a continued neglect of the requirements of limited or non-atomic war despite the increasing probability of this form of challenge with the growth of Communist strength and self-confidence.

b. The required reappraisal of our policy which I mentioned is made difficult by the inadequacy of our present strategy-making machinery, notably the National Security Council, the Department of Defense and the JCS organization. They should be thoroughly overhauled with deliberation but unfortunately our present situation is urgent. It cannot wait upon complete reorganization.

c. We can take some immediate measures. We can improve our readiness for limited war by better use of our existing resources.

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We can at least partially offset the missile gap by using Jupiter as a mobile field weapon (as it was intended), by an airborne alert for part of SAC, and by the initiation of a simple fallout protection program for our civil population.

d. The long term measures are the more important ones -- the rejection of a strategy of massive retaliation and the adoption of one of flexible response; the determination of how much is enough for all categories of operational functions; the subsequent building of a small mobile and secure missile force and a fully modernized Army and supporting services; a revised structure for the military budget to show clearly what it buys in terms of operational forces; and a new statement of roles and missions to show then what we really mean by the Army, Navy and Air Force.

For short and long term measures, there is need for decision now. From about 1961 on the tide will begin to turn against us -- unless we take heroic measures now. To change the trend will require men, money and sacrifice. The alternative is military inferiority --and there is no living long with Communism as an inferior.

The Chairman. In order to get the best organized presentation possible, we have asked our distinguished counsel, Mr. Weisl, to proceed with questioning for a period up to 45 minutes, and then each member of the committee will ask any questions they desire during the 10 minute period

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allotted to each member. I deeply appreciate your presence and your statement.

Mr. Weisl. General Taylor, in a publication issued on January 19 you were quoted as follows:

"I believe now that America is facing a period of grave potential danger. I have reached the reluctant but firm conclusion that during the next few years the United States will fall behind Russia as a world military power unless heroic measures are taken now. We are falling behind the Russians in our ability to wage all out hydrogen atomic war, and in our ability to fight limited conflicts with conventional arms."

Is that quotation your view today?

General Taylor. It is, sir.

Mr. Weisl. General, we are constantly told that while we may be behind the Soviets in certain areas such as the number of ICBMs, the number of IRBMs, the modernization of the ground forces, the number of submarines and so forth, but then we are told that overall our forces are adequate.

Has the Department of Defense ever established on an overall basis how much is needed to meet our commitments and to assure our security?

General Taylor. Before answering that, Mr. Weisl, I should remind the committee that I retired on June 30. Since that time I have been living largely out of the country.

bd9

My knowledge of classified information ended when I ceased to be an active officer, as it should. Consequently my response will be largely if not exclusively based upon my knowledge and experience up to June 30.

Mr. Weisl. Very well.

General Taylor. I would say that we have had for a number of years the unanswered problem of determining how much is enough by category of force. By that I mean that we no longer fight in terms or plan our warfare in terms of an Army, a Navy and an Air Force. Rather we think properly in terms of certain functions to be performed.

For example, we must have obviously a strong atomic deterrent force properly guarded against surprise attack. Those forces are made up largely on the offensive side of the bombers and missiles of the Navy and the Air Force.

They are defended by the interceptors of the Air Force and the surface to air missiles of the Army. All of those forces together constitute a single function, namely our atomic deterrent capability.

In my judgment we should budget in terms of that force. We have never determined first how big a force, how many missiles, how many planes, how many bombs on target are really necessary to set as a goal for these forces. And then furthermore as you know, we don't set up our defense budgets in such terms. I have taken only one function as an example.

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The same comment would apply say to our antisubmarine warfare forces, to what we call frequently our limited war forces, and so on. That is what I refer to as horizontal planning and budgeting to determine how much is enough.

Mr. Weisl. Has any such plan ever been determined?

General Taylor. We have never set goals except in the area of air defense, which could be considered means of indicating how much is enough under what we are building.

Mr. Weisl. Have we ever developed any machinery to match our commitments against our military capabilities?

General Taylor. No, sir. I would say that I know of no place in government where from time to time we tabulate our political commitments and ask ourselves the very pertinent question, do we have the means to meet these commitments if they fall due either singly or in combination.

When I was Chief of Staff, I had on my wall a chart, a small table version of which I have in front of me, which shows the United States military commitments around the world. I think it is a chart that many of our leaders in government should look at from time to time.

This chart shows that through our security pacts and our bilateral arrangements we have military commitments of varying forms to 45 different countries around the world. It is a sobering reminder of what we might be called upon to meet.

I am reminded also that most of these commitments would

d11 fall into what I call the limited war category, the area to which we give the least of our military thought. That perhaps only in the NATO area could we say that General Atomic War is the primary danger. In the other areas we would be called upon to meet initially at least a threat less than a general war.

Nevertheless in its entirety it is a very impressive list of requirements.

Mr. Weisl. Have we a plan to your knowledge or have we had a plan since you were a member of the Joint Chiefs since 1955 to meet those commitments?

General Taylor. We don't do it from that point of view. In other words, we don't take these commitments and add up what they might require and take that as a point of departure. Rather we tailor our forces to the means, largely the budgetary means made available, and then by planning and doing the best we can with what we have, we do formulate plans which could meet these requirements, at least in a territorial sense.

Mr. Weisl. In your opinion are these plans adequate?

General Taylor. Generally speaking they are as good as the means available can make them with one or two exceptions. I have never felt that we made all the necessary plans to form, train and ship out limited war forces as rapidly as we should.

This lack results from the absence of any headquarters,

d12      any joint headquarters in the United States charged with readiness for limited war. I have said and many of my friends do not agree with me that we should have a headquarters comparable to SAC, for example, with the same dedication to preparation for limited war as SAC does for general war.

Mr. Weisl. Do we have a plan to meet those commitments?

General Taylor. We have a plan to use our available resources if these commitments come due. Whether they are adequate or not is very questionable. I don't think they are adequate personally.

Mr. Weisl. Has the National Security Council or the Department of Defense to your knowledge formulated a plan to meet those commitments?

General Taylor. I would put it this way. The military the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is properly left to them to formulate the military plans to meet contingencies. However, there is no machinery in our government that I know of where from time to time the Joint Chiefs are asked "Now suppose commitment A, Y and Z fall due, what can you do about it"?

In other words, we don't consciously check on our capability.

Mr. Weisl. We have been told, General Taylor, that while the Department of Defense and the various services have had guidelines on expenditures, there really never was a ceiling on the budget for expenditures. What is your view on that?

ed13                   Has there been a budget ceiling on defense expenditures?

General Taylor. I think that perhaps we are just playing on words, Mr. Weisl. Certainly for practical purposes there was a finite limit on what we could count upon, and each year that amount was essentially the same.

I often point out that the split between the services was almost exactly the same for 4 years, 23% to the Army, 28% to the Navy, and 46% to the Air force, giving a suggestion of a frozen pattern, which I don't think corresponded to the changing world conditions.

Mr. Weisl. In your book which I understand was cleared securitywise -- is that true?

General Taylor. No, that is not quite an accurate statement. First I of course wrote this with a very close eye to security. I think I have a qualified opinion on security based upon my services as Chief of Staff. Then to check my judgment I asked for the views of our intelligence people in the Army with regard to security violations. I emphasize security as opposed to policy, and the answer was they found nothing which violated security. This was not a formal clearance.

Mr. Weisl. In your book you state as follows and I quote:

"The fact that there is a ceiling of around 40 billion dollars on the defense budget is a reminder to each chief that all military programs, however disparate in character,

bd14 are in fact competitors for a fixed number of dollars.

"This consideration tends to color the attitude of individual chiefs toward the program of sister services. It tends to make disinterested judgments more difficult than would be the case if it were possible to form judgments without such regard for fiscal consequences. The fixed defense budget by accentuating the interservice struggle for funds has become the prime cause of the service rivalry which is undermining national confidence in our military programs."

Would you like to comment on that?

General Taylor. No, I think unfortunately that that statement is accurate. I am sure that each chief has always tried to sit in judgment honestly and dispassionately, but I know very well that we all think in terms of the effect on the budget of decisions on new weapons, for example. I think that explains to a degree why the Army and the Navy have been very reluctant to support say Bomarc. I am equally certain that that is one of the reasons why the Navy and the Air Force have been reluctant to support Nike-Zeus, namely the ultimate effect upon a fixed budget.

Mr. Weisl. In your judgment has the fixed ceiling on budget kept pace properly with changing world conditions?

General Taylor. Well, I would say, sir, without any analysis of our budget, that it is hard to believe that the world has not changed in the last 4 or 5 years. Yet our

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military budgets have been virtually the same within a variation of one or two per cent in important items.

Mr. Weisl. Have you had an opportunity to discuss the requirements of the military with the National Security Council?

General Taylor. Each year there was a formal hearing on the military budget before the National Security Council. The various Chiefs and the Secretaries always made a rather complete presentation of the problem and the Department of Defense also showed what the budget carried with it. At no time, however, was it ever looked at as I say horizontally to determine really what operational forces would result from this kind of budget?

Mr. Weisl. Please expand on that. Tell us about your last meeting when you were chief of staff on the last budget. You describe it in your book. I don't want to take the time to read it. You tell the committee about it, when you meet with the Security Council and what opportunity you had to discuss the budget at that time.

General Taylor. I am afraid my memory now is a composite of a number of meetings but there was never a great deal of variation.

Usually the Department of Defense, the Comptroller, Mr. McNeil, would present to the National Security Council the breakout of the defense budget really commenting on it in auditor or comptroller-type language.

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Mr. Weisl. If I may be pardoned for interrupting you I might read what you said in your book.

General Taylor. That would be better, sir. Then I will be glad to answer any questions on the text.

Mr. Weisl. "On December 3, 1958, the Joint Chiefs and the Service Secretaries were invited to a stag dinner at the White House. The guests of the President included Vice President Nixon, Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson, Budget Director Maurice Stans, Mr. Gordon Gray and Defense Secretary Neil McElroy. We Chiefs had been given to understand that the purpose of the meeting was to allow us to discuss the problems of the new budget with the President. However, it turned out to be quite otherwise. After an excellent dinner in the main dining room, the President led his guests to the Library for talk over coffee. We did not take up budget specifics. Rather the conversation became a discussion of general economic conditions, the problems facing the Treasury, the need for greater team play on the part of the military chiefs in connection with the budget. Secretary Anderson made a very able statement concerning the importance of a balanced budget and a stable dollar. Several officials exhorted the Chiefs to give greater weight to economic factors and to assume joint responsibility for the defense budget in the form in which it was about to go to Congress, and after receiving something in the nature of a pep

bd17      talk, the Chiefs were allowed an opportunity to respond. When my turn came, I did not argue against the overall dollar ceiling of the defense budget, but did express my opinion that the planned use of funds therein would not get the most defense for our money. It was the old case of a fixed percentage division of the funds by services unchanged from year to year.

"I repeated again the argument that the rapid technological changes, the new weapons systems and the changing nature of the Communist threat required a completely new appraisal of our military requirements and the spending for them.

"No one took an open exception to these views, but subsequent events showed that they had no effect. In the end the 1960 budget followed the same pattern as the former ones."

Is that a correct statement of what took place?

General Taylor. Yes, sir. I think that was as I recall when my memory was fresh the high points of this meeting. It does focus attention on what to me is the most important point of all, namely that we must take time out now to see where we are going in national defense. I have ventured to make a number of suggestions on the direction it should go. Of course, they are sincere opinions on my part. On the other hand, no one man can suggest what really should be done.

I am not sure of the merit of some of these individual suggestions of mine, but I am sure of this one thing. Now is

bd18        the time to reappraise our national strategy and not follow the group pattern we have been following the past years.

Mr. Weisl. Now you stated that unless we take heroic measures now, we will fall behind irretrievably, fall behind the Russians in the future.

General Taylor. I am always impressed with the lead time of defense budgets. Very few things can be done quickly. The decisions we are taking this year, this year's budget, for example, will control the pattern and the capabilities of our forces 2, 3 or 4 years into the future.

In a sense, it mortgages the future. Hence I feel that we must take these critical decisions now, even though the crisis is not immediately on the doorstep perhaps.

Mr. Weisl. The critical decisions that are taken now will affect the future one, two, three, or four years from now, will they not?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Will you please expand on that briefly?

General Taylor. Most of the decisions we are talking about are either organizational in character or affect the equipment of our Armed Forces. Neither of these, either organization or major heavy equipment can be changed quickly. I think we are all aware of the time lag in such weapons as missiles, as complicated aircraft. In the field of the Army it takes time to constitute divisions, it takes time to

bd19      remodernize our forces. Consequently if we are going to change our posture in the mid-term future, clearly we must make our decisions and do something about it now.

Mr. Weisl. Our military plans depend to a large degree upon our intelligence estimates, do they not?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Suppose we decide 6 months or a year from now that we had underestimated Soviet capabilities or Soviet intentions. Could we quickly change our military programs to meet the revised estimates of the threat?

General Taylor. No. As I suggested in my previous answer, it would take time to do this, and every month that we wait now is a month irretrievably lost in changing our posture.

Mr. Weisl. What is your concept of our deterrent force?

General Taylor. I am frequently struck, Mr. Weisl, with the fact that we have confused our defensive thinking by using certain general words in a limited meaning. For example, you say our deterrent force. I suspect you refer to forces designed to deter general atomic war. I would stress that deterrence is a unit. It cannot be divided. In other words, we must have forces which will deter both general atomic war and limited wars as well. Otherwise the uncontrolled limited war may well grow into the great atomic war we are all attempting to avoid.

You asked me what are our deterrent forces? I would

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probably answer virtually all of our Armed Forces. In other words, we have it divided generally into two groups, the general war deterrent forces consisting of our strike forces of SAC and of the Navy, and our defensive forces representing air defense, and also a very important element, our overseas deployments, largely Army forces. Now in the deterrent forces for limited war, then we have again our overseas deployments plus those mobile reserves of the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force held here in the United States and deployable to meet limited war situations.

Mr. Weisl. Are we at a serious disadvantage in intercontinental missile warfare under the present plans?

General Taylor. Again let me remind you, Mr. Weisl, that I don't know what our figures are at the present time.

Mr. Weisl. As of June 30, 1959 when you retired.

General Taylor. I would say that we appeared to be facing such an inferiority not necessarily from the point of view of numbers. I tended in my own thinking to stress that numbers in the missile business is far from the answer, far from being the indicator of true strength. Numbers, of course, are important, but equally important are questions of accuracy, reliability and what I would call concealability. In other words, lack of vulnerability to attack. I have always felt that we were handicapping ourselves by placing our reliance on fixed missiles, because necessarily these bases, these

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locations are known or will be known to the enemy, and hence regardless of our numbers, we expose ourselves to needless loss.

Mr. Weisl. In your book you state, General, and I quote:

"From what we know of the Soviet methods, we can count upon their taking full advantage of concealment, dispersion and mobility for their missiles. Under such conditions, it will become impossible for our U. S. bombers and missiles to eliminate the Soviet missile threat even by an anticipatory strike. Thus a target system based upon attacking the Soviet missile forces will offer little advantage during most of this time frame. Our security against general atomic war can rest only upon deterrence.

"There will be no purely military solution capable of eliminating the danger."

General Taylor. That was my opinion at the time and it still is, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And it is still your opinion.

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. And you further state in your book: "As long as the United States is dependent largely upon manned bombers, the latter will be highly vulnerable to surprise strikes upon the easily located airfields. A surprise attack by ballistic missiles might well be followed by manned bombers, possibly using low level attack techniques.

bd22

"In such a disaster our civilian population would suffer catastrophic losses, particularly from fall out for which there has been no protection afforded on a nationwide scale."

Would you care to comment on that?

General Taylor. That is not a pleasant prospect, but I think it is one we have to contemplate.

Mr. Weisl. Have you recommended that precautions be taken to prevent catastrophic destruction of our population?

General Taylor. In terms of civil defense, sir?

Mr. Weisl. Yes, sir.

General Taylor. We have considered various patterns of civil defense, and my own position has been that we cannot go overboard on this, simply because of the great expenses involved and the need to apply most of our resources to offensive or strictly military measures.

On the other hand, it becomes clearer and clearer to me that some form of fallout protection is in fact a part of our deterrent posture.

In other words, the evidence that our civilian population is not completely vulnerable does have a deterrent effect, and hence should be included in our military measures.

Mr. Weisl. In your book you further make the following statement:

"I have been slow to accept the reality and the significance of the so-called missile gap. Reluctantly I have concluded there

bd23      is indeed such a gap which, in combination with other factors which will be mentioned, has a most significant bearing upon our military security."

Do you still stick to that statement?

General Taylor. I would say that I was reluctant to accept this fact of the existence of a missile gap because instinctively based upon my military experience I think there is always a tendency to build the other fellow up too big. In other words, the intelligence frequently frightens the commander, and I have tried to develop a resistance to that possible danger.

However, in view of the accepted figures on numbers and the obvious fact of concealment on the part of the Soviet missile system, and the fact that our retaliatory force was not being concealed or dispersed led me to conclude there is a gap in the sense not just of numbers but in the quality of the opposing forces.

Mr. Weisl. The following statement was made to the House Appropriations Committee last month, and I quote:

"Heretofore we have been giving you intelligence figures that dealt with the theoretical Soviet capability. This is the first time that we have an intelligence estimate that says "This is what the Soviet Union probably will do".

Therefore, the great divergence based on figures that have been testified to in years past narrows because we talked

bd24      about a different set of comparisons, ones that were based on Soviet capability. This present one is an intelligence estimate on what we believe he probably will do, not what he is capable of doing."

Do you think as a military commander, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on your long experience, that that is a sound way of measuring intelligence?

General Taylor. I am not unaware that this issue has come up, Mr. Weisl, although I have not had access to the facts and figures and hence cannot take a knowledgeable position on this issue. I will, if the chairman will excuse a rather facetious story, say how it struck me when I read this in the paper.

I was reminded of the absent-minded professor who went into his class in June and passed out the examination papers. Well, the children took a look at the questions and all let out a guffaw. They said "Professor, these are the same questions you asked last January." The professor somewhat perturbed, however, caught his breath and said "Ah, but children, this time the questions are the same but the answers are different."

No, I must say I was raised in the school that was taught to estimate enemy capability. Then as facts became available narrow the field of capabilities in light of the intelligence available.

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Mr. Weisl. The conclusion reached from your book in the area that I will now mention appears as follows, and you can correct me if my statement is not proper:

"The weakness in the Joint Chiefs of Staff system have left the planning of our military strategy to civilian amateurs and the budget makers."

Would you care to comment on that?

General Taylor. That is a compressed statement which really I should comment on at length but I don't want to take too much time of the committee.

I do think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, and I share responsibility for its failure, by not reaching clearcut military decisions or recommendations in many fields have abdicated their authority. I have sympathized with the Secretary of Defense in facing some of these very tough issues with split military advice.

Inevitably somebody has to decide these things. The absence of a military decision is in itself a positive act because it impels someone less qualified perhaps to take the decision. It is to that situation which I alluded in that particular reference.

Mr. Weisl. In your experience as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, how many split decisions have there been on vital issues?

General Taylor. 23 is the figure which I quote in the

bd26

book which came from my own bookkeeping of the results of the Joint Chiefs of Staff most of the time while I was a member. I believe that went up to March of last year.

Mr. Weisl. There were 23 split decisions. And in those split decisions did the Chairman usually decide with the service that he came from?

General Taylor. I think the record shows that, in the majority of the cases that he sided with, he was on the same side of the issue as the service he was from .

Mr. Weisl. For instance you pointed out that the Army was supported 3 times and rejected 20 times, the Navy was supported 13 times and rejected 10 times, the Marine Corps, which participated in only 11 splits, was supported 4 times and rejected 7 times. The Air Force, however, was supported 17 times and rejected 6 times.

The Chairman participated in only 21 splits. He supported 18, rejected 3, is that a correct estimate?

General Taylor. That is the tabulation which I kept, yes.

Mr. Weisl. What would you do to change this system?

General Taylor. I debated long and hard I can assure you, on that kind of organization might improve. One is never sure when there is dissatisfaction with a given situation how much depends upon organization and howmuch upon personali- ties.

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For example, the Joint Chiefs may be doing much better for all I know since they changed the Army Chief of Staff. However, my conclusion was that no committee regardless of membership, of personality, would cope with the problems being thrown at the Joint Chiefs.

Committees can do certain things well as this committee can, but on the other hand in the military business certain things have to be decided by one man with complete responsibility. Hence my conclusion was to divide the functions of the Joint Chiefs, leaving with a committee those things which a committee of wise experienced officers can cope with, and setting up a defense chief of staff for those functions now performed by the Joint Chiefs which were operational in nature.

In other words, we would split more or less down the middle the present functions, giving part to one man, a defense chief of staff, and the others to a council which I call for want of a better name, the Supreme Military Council of Officers, four-star in grade, who are either on their last assignment or are retired officers. They would be the advisory group to whom the Secretary of Defense would turn for policy advice, long range matters, comments on the budget in its broad senses, whereas the single chief of staff, the defense chief of staff would sit day by day, hour by hour with the Joint Staff prepared to conduct military operations any place around the world, and being a primary source of military requirements.

bd28

In other words, he would be checking what these commitments that I have just referred to mean in military terms, and he would generate then the basic data for the initial military budget.

Mr. Weisl. Your book states or I draw the conclusion, and I asked you this before but I think it is important to be expanded a little bit, that the weakness has left the planning of our military strategy to civilian amateurs and the budget makers. That is a dangerous situation, isn't it?

General Taylor. It certainly is an undesirable one, but again it results from the fact that the budget has to be made. There is a certain date when it has to be at the printers.

Hence those decisions which have not been thought through on military grounds have to be filled in by someone, usually unqualified in military matters.

Mr. Weisl. Do I understand correctly your conclusion or your opinion? We have 48 or 46 commitments around the world, is that right?

General Taylor. There are 48 countries with whom we have.

Mr. Weisl. 48 countries to whom we have military commitments.

General Taylor. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. In one form or another around the world. And that we have no plan, no overall plan, to meet those commitments

bd29

if called upon to meet them. Do I understand that correctly?

General Taylor. I would phrase it differently, saying that we do not establish the possible military requirements to meet these commitments, and build our forces consciously with the idea of these, that these commitments may fall due. I would stress we do have plans to use those forces which we have available today to the best of our ability if these various contingencies occur. The contingencies however were not considered in building up the forces.

Mr. Weisl. In other words, in building up your forces we didn't consider the contingency of being called upon to meet these commitments, is that correct?

General Taylor. We didn't start from requirements to build our forces, no.

Mr. Weisl. We did not start from requirements?

General Taylor. No, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Isn't that a perilous situation, shouldn't the United States be in a position when it makes a military commitment to build up the requirements to meet those commitments?

General Taylor. Certainly we should take time out from time to time and see how our capabilities pair up against the requirements or commitments. I don't suggest, I think it would be unfeasible, to have enough forces in being to meet every commitment assuming they occur all at the same time.

bd30

Mr. Weisl. I understand that, but have we taken the time out to see whether we have the requirements to meet one or more of these commitments.

General Taylor. Not in a broad governmental sense, no, sir.

Mr. Weisl. In your opinion have we done it properly or adequately?

General Taylor. No, sir, I do not think so.

Mr. Weisl. How are we going to meet those commitments if we haven't the machinery to have the requirements in time to meet one or more of these commitments?

General Taylor. Well, I have suggested in some of my writing that we do exactly what you propose, namely that the defense chief of staff be charged with consciously matching capabilities against requirements, and using that as the point of departure for annually reviewing of our forces.

Mr. Weisl. And you have never been charged, the chiefs of staff have never been charged with that duty?

General Taylor. Not in the language which I use. I wouldn't suggest for a moment, Mr. Weisl, that the Joint Chiefs don't think about it and talk about these things.

Mr. Weisl. I know you think and talk about it, but the question is have you planned the requirements to meet those commitments?

General Taylor. We have not built our forces specifically

bd31 to meet the requirements.

Mr. Weisl. Will you discuss our limited war capability briefly, General? We talk about an atomic and a nuclear war, but the enemy may decide not to engage in that kind of a war, to engage in a limited war or a nibbling war. Will you discuss whether we meet the requirements or plan the requirements for those kinds of wars?

General Taylor. As you know, Mr. Weisl, probably, I run into a question which I can't answer, namely assuming that we attain our present objective, and have such nuclear strength so that the possibility of that kind of war is ruled out, what then happens if a possible enemy decides that without starting a nuclear war, he will wage conventional war, and at an increasing scale.

At some point he is going to be able to fight a bigger limited war than we can, and we have to back away and let him win by default.

In other words, I have a strong feeling that we have been perhaps fascinated by the horrors and terrible possibilities of general nuclear war, and forgetting the fact we can well lose our country and our stake in the world by nibbling aggression increasing in size as the relative, as the improbability of a deliberate nuclear war becomes more and more remote.

Consequently it has seemed to me that we should look

d32           at our limited war forces, which fortunately are also used  
in general war, and verify that they are modern in their  
equipment, that they are mobile, that they are trained and  
that we have rapidity of reaction, something which our present  
organization does not provide.

So that I feel that a very definite gap exists,  
first in the use of the forces which we now have available  
for limited war, and secondly I question their adequacy when  
I look at these 48 commitments around the world.

Mr. Weisl. We have had testimony from you and from other  
capable and patriotic military men to the effect that the  
Russian Army not only has a greater number of divisions  
but that it has modernized its forces twice since World  
War II, that it has mechanized its forces, that it has  
mobile forces, that their guns and their artiller and  
their rockets outzank and outgun us, and that despite your  
constant pleas year after year, year after year for the  
modernization and the mobility and the mechanization of our  
Army, such requirements have not been met.

Do you still stand on that or have I stated it not  
adequately enough?

General Taylor. No, I would agree essentially with  
what you say. Last year and the year before I urged that  
we embark upon a modernization program for our Army. I  
stressed also that there should be a comparable modernization

bd33

for the Air Force and the Navy and the Marines in order to improve our readiness largely for limited war.

In the case of the Army that would have called for a five year program of about \$3 billion a year for modernization purposes. Actually we got less money last year for modernization than that required simply to replace wear out and obsolescence.

Mr. Weisl. I think too -- my time is about up I am told -- as a final question, I believe you have testified that instead of finding out what we need for our overall defense posture, we figure it out on the basis of how much does the Army get, what slice of the pie does the Navy get, what slice of the pie does the Air Force get, but there is no overall planning as to functions of all of these departments?

General Taylor. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Weisl. Will you explain it a little better than I can?

General Taylor. We never look at our force, we never build our forces or buy our forces in a budget sense in terms of military function. Atomic retaliation, limited war capability, antisubmarine warfare, continental air defense. We don't case our books in that form. So as a result, I never do, and I doubt personally that anyone knew exactly what we are buying with our budget.

Mr. Weisl. Then how can we constantly speak of this

bd34 overall adequacy when we have no overall consideration under the budget?

General Taylor. That would be I would say an opinion which only the Secretary of Defense could have who had listened to all the 3 budgets in detail, and perhaps himself had made the kind of estimate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were never in the budget making business in this sense. Hence the best we could do would be to form a personal idea of what might be accomplished, without having really an expert tri-service appraisal of our military function.

Mr. Weisl. Mr. Chairman, may we put General Taylor's chart of our commitments, military commitments around the world, in the record?

The Chairman. Without objection the chart will be included.

(The chart referred to follows:)

COMMITTEE INSERT

bd35

Mr. Weisl. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Weisl.

I want to commend the members of the committee for concluding his questions without interruption.

I think that all of us will elicit more information if we follow an agreed upon procedure. Each member will have not to exceed 10 minutes, and I hope that they can conclude their questioning in less time, and I assure each member that we will go around a second time if that maybe desirable.

General Taylor, as I stated earlier, each year Congress is called upon to make very important decisions affecting our security. We cannot make these decisions unless we are candidly and fully advised by the people in whom we have great confidence. It was just a few years ago I remember when we called upon General Eisenhower, who was then in retirement.

He was one of those Generals that we asked to come back and counsel with us when we were confronted with a recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and Congress was concerned about whether that recommendation was adequate or not.

I remember upon that occasion General Eisenhower's testimony. This committee has great confidence in you and you have a record of public service of which all Americans are proud. We want to make it clear to the committee and to the country that you come here today at our invitation in an

bd36 attempt to serve the country through the Congress. I have two or three very brief questions I want to ask you, General Taylor.

Do you have any doubts in your mind as to the intentions of the Soviet Union toward the United States?

General Taylor. In terms of specific actions, yes, sir. I don't know their intentions.

The Chairman. Do you have the feeling that we can afford to let down our preparedness guard in the thought that perhaps if they want to colonize us, they much prefer to colonize a going concern rather than one they have destroyed, and therefore we must be more concerned with economic warfare than military preparedness.

General Taylor. No, sir.

I think our safety must be assured across the board.

The Chairman. Last year, General, you joined the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in signing a statement which you will remember was presented to this committee, and I should like to quote it. It says: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the fiscal year 1960 proposed expenditure figure of \$40,945,000,000 is adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense of the nation for the period under consideration. They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the budget in its present form, but all have reservations with respect to the funding of some

bd37 segments of their respective programs."

Now later in testifying before this committee, General, you listed the specific reservations you had to the budget. I wonder since you listed those specific reservations that you had on the budget before the committee if you ever had ample opportunity to discuss with the President himself your specific reservations to your specific budget.

General Taylor. I would say that before the National Security Council in the annual review of the budget, I did have ample opportunity to express my views on the military budget, particularly the Army's part of it. It was not done in specifically the format which responded to your request, you will recall.

The Chairman. But that was done before the budget was submitted to the Congress and you had opportunity to present that to the Council and the President had opportunity to hear you and to exchange viewpoints?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Counsel refers me to page 73 of your book in which you state: "Although this document supports the Secretary of Defense it had been classified confidential by the Chiefs and came to Congress, where it soon became a public document. This boomeranged because a close reading of the paper showed the Chiefs had not supported the '60 budget at all but had stated in effect that the overall expenditure

bd38 figure could be adequate provided the funds were used pretty much as they individually thought appropriate.

Conceding only that nothing of importance had been entirely overlooked in the budget they indicated reservations about the adequacy of certain programs which being unspecified in the memorandum soon became the subject of Congressional query as to their size and as to their nature."

Earlier today, General, you said "The required reappraisal of our policy is made difficult by the inadequacy of our present strategic making machinery, notably the National Security Council, the Department of Defense and the JCS organization.

"They should be thoroughly overhauled with deliberation but unfortunately our present situation is urgent. It cannot wait upon complete organization."

How do you believe, General, each of these three organizations you mentioned, the Security Council, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be changed?

General Taylor. I would refer rather to the change of the product with regard to the National Security Council. I make the point in my writing that never was the guidance given the Department of Defense in such specific terms that the Chiefs really knew the kind of forces and the kind of military preparedness the country, the Council really wanted. There was a tendency, inevitable perhaps in the kind of body such as the

bd39 NSC is, to reach compromises in language, since paragraph after paragraph of the guidance resulted from committee work in which several departments were represented.

As a result, the Chiefs received a document which had paragraphs which seemed to support my point of view, for example, namely a strategy of flexible response and rejection of massive retaliation.

Yet others could find paragraphs which seemed to refute that. So a need for a precise guidance so that the Chiefs really know what kind of forces the executive branch expects them to provide is step number one.

Step number two is within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where my suggestion is that the committee system can never solve many of the problems now facing the Chiefs.

By dividing into a committee of men separated from the service I think the broad term policy guidance could be achieved. I think the kind of rapid decision implicit in operational matters and affairs related to operations would be met then by a single Chief of Staff. Finally I go back again to the question of the budget within the Department of Defense. Until the Joint Chiefs set goals which are approved by the Secretary of Defense for the size of our functional forces, we will never know exactly what we are buying. So it is really those 3 points, sharpened guidance from the NSC, a revision of the JCS system and a new kind of budgeting would sum up my suggestions.

bd40           The Chairman. Have you read the legislation recently introduced by Senator Symington calling for a single Chief of Staff?

General Taylor. Only the newspaper accounts, sir.

The Chairman. Would you care to give your comments in connection with your impression of the newspaper accounts?

General Taylor. No, sir. I would have to study that. I believe that Senator Symington would really simply make the present chairman a single chief, and retain the other chiefs as a part of a JCS organization. I would think that would retain some of the objectionable features of the present system. I would prefer to have this council entirely apart from the services to be the advisory elder statesmen group assisting the Secretary of Defense.

I must say I have answered you tentatively because I have not studied the proposal.

The Chairman. General, when the 1960 budget was before the National Security Council, did you just merely make a formal presentation or did you have an opportunity to fully discuss it, debate it and exchange viewpoints about it?

General Taylor. The services had an ample opportunity, both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, to read or give to the Council anything that it wanted to say. However, the defense budget is such a large and intricate affair that there is very little discussion possible before a large committee

bd41

like the NSC. I think that is inherent in the nature of a large gathering of this sort. I would say that the member who came to the table without any background would have only a very general impression of what the budget meant.

The Chairman. In addition to that opportunity, do you believe that any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that had serious reservations about his budget and felt that the security of his country is involved would have the slightest hesitation to ask the President for an opportunity to review it in some detail with him?

General Taylor. No, sir. The President always emphasized the point that any chief who really had something on his desk should come and talk to him.

The Chairman. So then really we can understand that the military head of each service had adequate and ample opportunity to present his views not only to the Council but to the President individually if he so desired?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And you have no doubt if they felt it serious enough, that they would have had the courage to ask for an appointment to carry through on it.

General Taylor. That is true, sir, unless as I felt last year that the President by presentations to him understood fully what the budget was.

Senator Bush. Will the Senator yield for one question

bd42 right in line of his thinking on this?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Bush. Under your conception of the Defense Chief of Staff, General, you believe that in this way we would point up what our requirements are sharper under that type of system. But do you also think that it would result in savings through the elimination of items that get through under the present system?

In other words, would the defense chief of staff not only be able to get some of the necessary things done that you have pointed up so well, but also be able to cut out some things and effect economies that it is very difficult to do under the present system of divided authority?

General Taylor. I would certainly hope, Senator, that this being a better organization, we would do all of our business in a more efficient way. It would imply, however, the change in budgeting, budget making also. Without that, many of the fiscal advantages I am afraid would be lost.

Senator Bush. But the budgetary revision would be implicit in your plan of a defense chief, would it not?

General Taylor. Not necessarily. The way I propose it, yes, it is one of the 3 steps which I would suggest as being required, and all 3 together in a package.

Senator Bush. I see.

The Chairman. Now concluding, General, do you really think

bd43

that your presentation before the Security Council, accurately describing it, is a full and adequate presentation of your views and exchange of ideas between you and the members of the council instead of just a rather formal presentation?

General Taylor. Yes, sir, it was adequate.

The Chairman. General, our other officials admit that the Soviets will have a decided superiority in ballistic missiles during the next few years. Do you know whether the Russians are working on an antiballistic missile system?

General Taylor. No, I do not.

The Chairman. What do you think would happen if the Soviets now having an edge in ballistic missiles that they also have an antiballistic missile system. Could they use this system to practice atomic blackmail on us?

General Taylor. Yes, sir, anyone who gets an effective missile defense, the side that gets it first certainly has a very definite advantage both in a military and in a psychological sense.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Bridges, Mr. Saltonstall, Mrs. Smith, Mr. Wiley.

Senator Wiley. Yes, I have some questions. Under paragraph one, you say "The placing of major reliance on weapons of massive destruction has lost all justification in view of Soviet progress in atomic weapons and long-range missiles. It did not keep the peace when we had a complete

bd44

monopoly of atomic weapons. It is obviously incapable of coping with the rising level of Communist provocation which is accompanying the rise in Soviet military strength."

I presume that from that paragraph you feel that there is really no deterrence then?

General Taylor. I was making this point: That no matter how much strength we have in the atomic retaliatory field, we have never and probably never will be able to keep the small peace.

We have had 18 limited wars more or less since 1945. Most of that time or a good part of the time we were the only nation that had atomic weapons, which is to me a pretty good indication that that kind of strength does only one thing.

It offsets retaliatory strength in kind on the other side, but does not assist in the limited war area.

Senator Wiley, From your language in paragraph 3 you speak of the decline accompanied by continued neglect of the requirements of limited or nonatomic war despite the increasing probability of this form of challenge with the growth of Communist strength and self-confidence."

Now my question is this: Do you think there is now any evidence, not simply from the military but from every angle, any evidence that Russia would be so foolish as to let the balloon go up and get into a struggle which would mean the

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destruction of not only the contending parties but maybe the race?

General Taylor. I have always said, sir, that I felt that deliberately initiated general atomic war was highly improbable. On the other hand, we certainly must maintain our retaliatory capability to be sure that improbability never disappears. But I am just as certain that the Soviets are not going to give up provocative and aggressive measures supported by military action short of general war.

Senator Wiley. Now in reply to Senator Johnson in speaking about the overhaul, I got the impression speaking about the overall, I got the impression that in the overall that you outlined that there should be one man in making the decision, the final decision, is that right?

General Taylor. No, except in this sense. The man to make the final decision is the President or the Secretary of Defense. Under our civilian control of the military, in which I believe absolutely, inevitably a civilian at some point must decide military subjects. The defense chief of staff to whom I refer would be nothing but a chief of staff.

In other words, he would have no command powers, but would report directly to the Secretary of Defense and perform the functions normally implicit in the term of the Chief of Staff.

Senator Wiley. I was interested in the figures. Did I get the right percentage, 23, 28 and 46% which you said was the

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pattern that has remained more or less static now for years?

General Taylor. Yes, the balance going to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Wiley. In other words, the Navy was 23?

General Taylor. Army 23, Navy 28, Air Force 46.

Senator Wiley. Now is it my understanding that you feel that the change from the old style of war which you knew as a boy to the war possibilities now under missiles and atomic bombs and so forth has made some of the services subordinate to what they were before?

General Taylor. No, sir.

Senator Wiley. What is your position?

General Taylor. My position is that the situation in the world in the last four or five years is obviously changed. The military requirements have obviously changed. Yet our budget pattern shows no reflection of that fact. But even if one doesn't agree with the changes which I have suggested are necessary, I think it is very difficult to resist the argument that some change has been necessary.

Senator Wiley. Of course you are speaking in your next paragraph that we can take some measures. Now let's get at that.

In other words, you suggest that what we should do by off-setting the missile gap, using Jupiter as a mobile field weapon.

bd47

I would like to know a little more about that.

General Taylor. I really suggest about four things, which do not require much time. Most of the really important measures will take several years to do.

One thing we could do is to use our limited war forces which we have better.

We can organize them better. We can train them and equip them better. That will not take much time. The next is the Jupiter missile which was designed as a 1500 mile mobile field missile. It has since had that feature removed from it, but it still remains probably the most tested missile of any range which we have.

I consider that it could be used as a stopgap until we get better intercontinental missiles. The other two measures I suggest are better protection for SAC, which I think we all agree is important, and also some form of fallout protection.

Senator Wiley. Tell me a little more about this Jupiter. Where would you use them, in connection with any of our allies or any of our bases, or on submarines or on airplanes?

Where would the missile be used?

General Taylor. I would first look to those places under the American flag such as Alaska, let's say, or Okinawa.

Then I would talk to our allies who will accept the missile which is not fixed. The fact of being fixed makes the missile

bd48

very unattractive because it is bound to draw fire in time of war.

Without mentioning names in a public hearing, I think a number of our allies of the rugged type I would say would be quite happy to take a mobile field missile.

Senator Wiley. I got the impression in a general sense that you felt that we should spend some more money to get more fight, so to speak. In other words, we have got to tighten our belts, is that your idea?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Now let's go into that, because I think that is very important. I think that if we are going to tighten our belts, America should understand that we can't be voting money over here on matters that are of secondary consideration when it is a question you think of the very safety of America, is that right?

General Taylor. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. How much do you think we should put into the budget?

General Taylor. That is very hard to estimate, Senator, just off the top of my head.

In my book I say I suspect we are talking in terms of a budget of 50 to 55 billion for the next five years. No one could really know until all the services go into this thoroughly and do the kind of job required of it every year with a

bd49

military budget.

Senator Wiley. You say among other things that the long term measures are the important ones, and that the rejection of a strategy of massive retaliation and the adoption of one of flexible response in determination of how much is enough for all the categories of operational functions, the subsequent building of a small mobile - I don't know who is keeping time here but it seems to me that you are trying to cheat me of a couple of minutes.

The Chairman. Senator, we will give you a couple of extra minutes.

Senator Wiley. You are so kind. That smile got me this time too.

The subsequent building of a small mobile and secure missile force and a fully modernized Army and supporting services, a revised structure for the military budget to show clearly what it buys in terms of operational forces, and a new statement of roles and missions to show what we really mean by Army, Navy and Air Force.

Now there is a statement that I would like to have you really go into and let us know, because now at long last someone is telling the Army, Navy and Air Force the things that they should know, that America should know. If there is waste, we want to find that out. If there can be savings we want to find that out. If we can better them as

bd50      an arm of defense, we want to find that out. Now you tell us how?

General Taylor. Senator, I wrote a book on the subject that sold for \$4 at any book stand.

Senator Bush. The Congressional Library has it.

General Taylor. I heard the Senator's question. He wanted to learn. Now what is your reply?

The Chairman. . . I am really at a loss as to where to begin in my reply.

The Chairman. I mean we didn't hear your reply there, something about your book. What was it?

General Taylor. I just facetiously, I hope the Senator will excuse me, pointed out I have written a book on the subject that sells for \$4 at any book stand.

Senator Wiley. Will you loan me the \$4 and I will buy it right now.

(Laughter.)

The Chairman. May I say to the members of the committee that may care to read it that the book is available, that committee counsel has a copy. Go ahead.

Senator Wiley. How about my credit, is it any good?

General Taylor. Which one of these points shall I take up first, Senator?

Senator Wiley. Well, if you will go to page 2, subsection D, "Long term measures are more important" and so

bd51        forth, "rejection of the strategy of massive retaliation" and so forth.

What I am getting at is that we need a bill of particulars. Generals don't mean anything. What we need is a bill of particulars so that the various branches of the Armed Forces will know what your judgment is and we know, because I personally am much impressed with what you said and I feel it is important that we get the benefit of your long-range judgment.

General Taylor. I will answer briefly then one by one or comment upon these phrases which I have used in this paragraph. My overall thought is that we have relied on massive retaliation as really the cornerstone of our military strategy since 1945, but with the growth of the Soviet atomic and missile power, that no longer has any meaning other than to offset the weapons in kind of the Soviet Union.

That if we are really going to deter war, we must think also of deterrence across the board, so that we are just as able and competent to cope with challenges short of general war as we are with general war itself.

Senator Wiley. You used the words "Heroic phrases", that is what I am getting at.

Mr. Weisl. Heroic measures.

Senator Wiley. Heroic measures?

General Taylor. That, Senator, I used that phrase to emphasize my feeling of urgency, that we should get going now.

bd52

We should do these immediate measures which I tabulate under paragraph (c) above and get on with the business of moving down the line in accordance with the suggestions of paragraph (d).

They are heroic in the sense that we can't do business as we have been doing it in the past.

A definite change has to be made in our thinking and in our procedures.

Senator Wiley. I think that is all.

The Chairman. Senator, you consumed 3 additional minutes. Senator Stennis, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Senator Stennis. General Taylor, something that I have been impressed with, I am glad you are pointing out that we have these commitments to 48 different nations, and I know with a great many of them we can hardly expect any reasonable appreciable assistance from them .

But as to some of them, and particularly those that are getting back on their feet, that are already back on their feet, what is your judgment as to whether or not they should not be called on now for greater support in men or in money, materiel? Give us your thought on that. There is not time to go into detail.

General Taylor. Certainly we cannot achieve our objectives in this world without our friends, without our allies. In the military field, it is improper and shortsighted to talk only

bd53 in terms of our U. S. assets. Many of these countries which you know well, Senator, do make a material contribution to our overall military strength, others for various reasons a lesser one.

I would say our general strategy must be predicated upon the continued existence of strong friends, and by that token--

Senator Stennis. I take that as a start, but what could be done toward getting down to something more along the lines of weapons coordination?

I know that the Army did quite a bit as I recall with say the rifle, just the ordinary rifle, interchange of weapons, interchange of parts, a common denominator for ammunition?

General Taylor. Yes.

Senator Stennis. Now what could be done along that line in missiles, say, ground to ground missiles? I understand that we are supporting 32 different types and kinds of missile programs.

General Taylor. We ought to simplify it as you suggest, as we know what the lame ducks are, we should scratch them off the list. There is a constant purifying process to which our missile program should be submitted, and I also endorse your suggestion, your implied suggestion, that insofar as possible, we ought to standardize with our allies on weapons.

We all concede the principle, but practically as you know it has been quite difficult to carry out.

bd54

Senator Stennis. In carrying that on further, I find that there is very little mutual activity or coordinated activity in the field of basic research with our allies that are capable of carrying on such work, highly capable.

In skills and techniques they exceed us in many respects. From what little investigation I have made, there is practically no coordinated activity or sharing of talent or sharing of money costs or materiel.

Perhaps this is altogether out of your field, but do you know of any practical suggestion that could be made along that line?

General Taylor. No. I agree certainly again with your principle. I am not an expert in the field. You can get a much better witness than I am on this subject.

Senator Stennis. It seems to me that so much more could be done than is being done with reference to some basic planning for cooperation. It is well to say we must have allies, we must support them and we must stand together. But I think this is a long range proposition and we have got to plan for 50 years or more. Many of these nations cannot share this cost, responsibility, but many can, do you know of any suggestion? I hardly know where to turn for some one that could make practical suggestions along this line?

General Taylor. I am afraid I don't have anything. As you know, the services, many of them, do have overseas research

bd55

and development offices which are supposed to be in contact with the best minds of our allies.

Senator Stennis. On the Armed Services Committee we have these many different missile programs that come before us for approval of funds. I get it in military construction.

We have to set up different factories, and then when they get to the next stage we have to set up different kinds of shops to prepare all these missiles, and that calls for living quarters and all for the men and support of various kinds, and each of the services have an appreciable amount of their money going in for those separate respective programs. Then some of them are marked down and they have to be and should be when they don't come through. Is there any way that that could be coordinated, and avoid having to provide funds from the ground up, so to speak, for each of these separate programs?

General Taylor. No. I think we should use overseas indigenous manpower perhaps faster than we have in the past. We do encounter difficulties with atomic weapons, difficulties which perhaps should be looked at. But I quite agree with your suggestion that most of these weapons which we are giving our allies, there are people there who can be trained to man these weapons, and we should withdraw as soon as practicable.

Senator Stennis. Your suggestion here, I have a growing realization as a member of this committee that something must

b656      be done to get into the system of the Joint Chiefs. It is not as you point out a matter of personality or individuals.

It is the system that must be changed to meet these problems. Now you suggested this supreme military council. I had to leave and that is the reason I want to be sure I get your main point.

They could be composed of experienced military men at the high level who were either retired or to a degree withdrawn from that service, there, their last assignment I believe.

General Taylor. That's right.

Senator Stennis. And just what function now would they perform?

General Taylor. They would take over all of the committee type advisory functions which the Joint Chiefs now have. The Chiefs are asked a tremendous number of questions of this nature.

For example, on disarmament, what should be the position of the Secretary of Defense on disarmament, that kind of thing. That should be the long range strategic posture of our country. In other words, each year the Joint Chiefs now wrestle with this paper, the strategic posture of the United States. That is susceptible to discussion, to debate, to adjustment of point of view of the nature of any good committee function, so that long-range policy, long-range advice, overall comments upon force structure, budget and so forth would come from

bd57        this group of I call them military wise men for lack of a better name.

And those things that have to be done now on the minute in time of war by a single man, those functions would be taken away from the Joint Chiefs.

A committee no matter who they are, how good they are, can't cope with this kind of thing.

Senator Stennis. My time is about up. This military council, would they take a part in what a layman calls the war plans, formulation of the war plans?

General Taylor. The actual plan would be drawn up by the Chief of Staff, the Defense Chief of Staff in consultation with his overseas commanders.

He would submit this plan to the Secretary of Defense presumably through this council. So that you would get their overall review, not in a nitpicking sense but from the strategic point of view.

Senator Stennis. Now I missed altogether the other prong of this 2.(d) plan that you brought out. You had the supreme military council. Then did you say you would have a single Chief of Staff?

General Taylor. Single Chief of Staff and revise the budget making procedure in accordance with the so-called horizontal budgeting by functional forces.

Senator Stennis. Who would take care of that? That was the

bd58 I didn't hear that.

General Taylor. It still remains the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. But I would say it would be built up differently as I visualize it with the requirements coming from the field forces through the defense chief of staff. That would be the starting point.

Senator Stennis. I have thought about it many times. A young man goes to the Academy say at 18 years of age and spends the rest of his time in that service until he reaches the chief of staff level and is charged with the responsibility of sponsoring the cause of that service.

I just know it is contrary to all the principal elements of human nature for him to be able to just take that cap off when he got down to the last step and be impartial and think solely in terms apart from his military service.

I don't think it can possibly be done and should not be expected, even though you make a mighty good effort at it.

Did you say now that with these 48 countries that we have commitments to, that there is really no plan of carrying out those commitments that has been formulated?

General Taylor. No, sir, I wouldn't suggest there is no plan. Really the point I have been making is that we do not build our forces with an eye to being able to meet these commitments. We rather build our forces and then look at our commitments and decide how best we will use what we have

bd59

got, whereas I would say the starting point should be the other way.

Senator Stennis. The starting point should be at the bottom.

General Taylor. That's right.

The Chairman. Senator Martin?

Senator Martin. General, I have listened to all you have said very carefully but I am still not clear how you would centralize this recommendation of power in decisions that are handed up to the Secretary of Defense on the matter of budget making on the one hand and on the matter of strategy or planning, either military strategy or planning new weapons and their use.

In whom would you place that, General, for the entire defense picture?

General Taylor. There is no question either the Secretary of Defense and he in turn undoubtedly on the major issues would carry them to the Commander in Chief, the President.

Senator Martin. I have reference to the step below the Secretary of Defense. Would the Secretary of Defense bring in these recommendations from the various branches of the services?

General Taylor. No, that would be his Chief of Staff, the Defense Chief of Staff acting in the name of the Secretary.

Senator Martin. A civilian?

bd60

General Taylor. No, sir. He will be a four or five star officer acting for the Secretary of Defense. He will get the recommendations from the field commanders, consolidate them, put in his own recommendation and then pass the whole thing for decision to the Secretary.

Senator Martin. One defense chief of staff to cover Army, Air Force and Navy, and Marines?

General Taylor. Not within the United States, but in the overseas commands. In other words, the operational forces. You would still have presumably a Secretary of the Army, a Secretary of the Navy and a Secretary of the Air Force. But their job has nothing to do with operations. They create the forces which they are directed to create by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator Martin. Your centralization there has to do with overseas matters?

General Taylor. Operational matters. That would include some forces in the United States such as our continental air defense, our missiles on site and our limited war forces who are awaiting transportation overseas.

Senator Martin. That organization had reference primarily to strategy and planning and division of responsibilities.

General Taylor. That is correct, operational activities.

Senator Martin. Yes, operational activities. Now that is quite apart then from budget problems.

bd61

General Taylor. Yes.

Senator Martin. Do you have an idea of the same type of centralization on budget problems?

General Taylor. No. The end process would be essentially what it is now, namely the Comptroller of the Department of Defense putting together a budget, but he would put it together under certain directives of the Secretary of Defense, which in turn would reflect insofar as the money in sight permitted the recommendations of the military commanders who have the responsibility for meeting these commitments we have been talking about.

Senator Martin. Each of the services would clear through this Chief of Staff of Defense to coordinate matters and present to I would call him a budget chief of staff now.

General Taylor. The budgetary action would flow from 2 directions into the Comptroller and the Secretary of Defense. One through the Defense Chief of Staff who would collate all of the operational requirements how much Army, Navy and Air Force do you need in Europe, how much do you need in the Pacific? On the other hand, the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force also have billions which are now generated by the need to develop and train these forces.

So you would really have two streams of requirements to the Secretary of Defense, one from his chief of staff and the

bd62

other from his three secretaries.

Senator Martin. Then the domestic matter and budget making primarily come through the three secretaries?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Martin. Who is their principal source of consultation under them within the arms of which they are secretary?

Is Defense satisfactory in that?

General Taylor. They have their chief of staff, chief of Naval operations and so on.

Senator Martin. I am very much interested in your plans in operational work, but this matter of budget making and decision as to who gets what to do and how much, that comes squarely on our doorstep here in Congress.

I don't ever expect to cross the path of any tactical decision maker in the Armed Forces, but I have to pass a matter of judgment as a member of the Senate on almost every decision made in the matter of cost and expansion of particular new weapons, missiles and new ships, new submarines and whatnot, and there I have to follow pretty closely the change that you recommend. You think the present organization is adequate and satisfactory in that field?

General Taylor. Within the United States insofar as the Departments are concerned, what I would hope, what I am suggesting would make it easier for Congress to see specifically what kind of forces the dollars would generate which you

bd63

approve.

Senator Martin. Yes. Now in the missile, the intercontinental ballistic missile field, do you call that a domestic affair or is that overseas operations?

General Taylor. I would say first to decide how many we need, how much is enough, is very definitely a military problem. Then how much we actually provide becomes a matter of common sense. Do we have the money for the maximum number or is there some lesser number we can get by with.

Senator Martin. Now who is the man I am going to look to for that common sense?

General Taylor. Again the Secretary of Defense will have to make his decision insofar as he can decide with regard to his initial budget. Then the budget will come over here and you gentlemen will ask some very pointed questions.

Senator Martin. There have been some very serious questions raised here on this budget and how far we are going to go, and I want to know the channel through which this has all come up to us, because of the heavy problem on my doorstep right now.

That is all.

Senator Stennis. Thank you. Next on our list is Senator Engle. Senator Engle, you have 10 minutes.

Senator Engle. General, I am glad you are here. I congratulate you on your testimony. I regret your leaving

bd64 the military.

I think it is a great loss to the nation. I am glad you are back here to help us with reference to these organizational problems particularly. I would like to say to you that I agree with you 100%. I would like to ask you this question: If there was a disposition to put the kind of reorganization that you have in mind into execution immediately, can we do it under the provisions of existing law, that is the Reorganization Act of 1958, or is additional legislation needed?

General Taylor. I would be reasonably sure, that additional legislation would be required. I have not studied it specifically from that point of view.

Senator Engle. You would particularly have to do it I take it with reference to the change of function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the establishment of this group of senior officers would act as the wise men, as you call them.

General Taylor. Yes, I am sure it would require a law because we are changing the status of the present chairman. We are also really eliminating the Joint Chiefs of Staff as presently constituted.

Senator Engle. It would be my impression that there are a lot of things that can be done under the Reorganization Act of 1958 such as unifying certain of the supplying service organizations, the doctors, the lawyers, the military attaches to foreign embassies, the Chaplain service and all of those

bd65           that could be presently done under existing law.

Would you agree with that?

General Taylor. I am not sure. I would just point out that those things really are on the fringes of this major strategic reorganization.

Senator Engle. Now I observed that in mentioning the type of division that you would make so far as functions and missions are concerned, you mentioned atomic war, limited war, and antisubmarine and continental air defense, those four.

Is that about the breakdown that you would have so far as functions and missions is concerned?

General Taylor. Antisubmarine warfare, strategic movements, particularly strategic airlift I believe cover it.

Senator Engle. Was there any particular reason for stating them in that order?

If you had to establish a priority and eventually we have to establish priorities with reference to what we are going to do first and why we think it is first, how would you establish the priorities that we need now?

General Taylor. I have a rather detailed discussion or priorities in the book which I have written. I would say that generally speaking I establish a concurrent priority in the offensive and defensive strike force for retaliation, and at the same time those forces necessary for counterattrition, the limited war force which we have to have at

bd66

the same time. Now everything else, deciding how much is enough to provide reasonable deterrence in those two fields, is the first requirement. Other things are going to be necessary.

You have to have some antisubmarine warfare forces in case our deterrents fail. We are going to have to have some air defense of the United States in case our deterrence fails. We are going to have to have some civil defense. But those things which are provably a part of our deterrence of general or limited war are our first priorities.

Senator Engle. You would put the retaliatory strike force plus the capability of waging limited war on an equal basis of priority?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Engle. And the others would come second or third in whatever order we could manage them?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Engle. That raises a question that has often intrigued me, and perhaps from your experience you can tell us how they do it. How do they determine how much of the money is going to be put in the retaliatory strike force, how much in the limited war force, how much in antisubmarine and how much in Continental air defense?

How are these arrived at? How do they get these percentages in this budgetwise?

d65 67

General Taylor. Generally speaking they don't do it that way. That is one of my points of which I am critical. I think we should cast our budget in just those terms. Now we have a hearing on the Army, what does the Army require, and the Secretary of Defense spends many, many hours just talking with the Army. Then in the next two or three weeks, he examines the Navy and the Air Force. But those categories of forces to which more than one service makes a recommendation we never isolate those and look at them as a composite and ask ourselves is that enough?

Senator Entle. Let me ask this question. We know that the Army has a retaliatory strike capability in the intermediate range ballistic missile. We know that the Navy has --

General Taylor. Excuse me, that has been given to the Air Force. The Army does not have an intermediate ballistic missile at this time. The Jupiter was built by the Army but turned over to the Air Force.

Senator Engle. I assume that sooner or later the Army will have some kind of missile capability. It doesn't have it now. And we know that the Navy has some off their carriers. We know about the intercontinental ballistic missile and SAC. Now does anybody sit down and add up what everybody has in the way of retaliatory strike capability and put it all in one cluster so that we can say that 20% of the budget or 14 or 15% of it or umpteen billion dollars

bd68 is going into strike capability?

General Taylor. I used to do that with my staff for my own guidance. It has never been done officially by the Secretary of Defense nor been reported to the Congress in those terms so far as I know.

Senator Engle. The budget isn't presented to Congress on the basis of functions and missions but on the basis of how much the Navy gets, how much the Army, the Air Force?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Engle. And you protest that procedure?

General Taylor. I say we can never really know what we are buying if we deal on that basis.

Senator Engle. Because you will be overbuilt in one section and underbuilt in another, will you not?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Engle. I observe that you make a point of the necessity of action, and I think this is something the country doesn't generally understand, and if you agree, I will ask you if you agree with me that the decisions we make this year set the premise for what we can do two years from now?

General Taylor. Even farther, from 2 to 4 years from now.

Senator Engle. If we don't make these decisions now to do this, when we get to '61 or '62, the time will have

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gone by and we simply will not be able to do those things that would be necessary even if at that time we determine they should be done?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Engle. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. Senator Case?

Senator Case. General, it is good to have you back and see you.

I wonder if you could discuss a little bit this matter of limited war which has always been a very baffling kind of thing for me. To state it quickly, nobody could possibly disagree we ought to have the capacity to fight limited wars if wars are going to be limited because all out wars would be destructive of everything.

But what do you mean when you say limited, limited as to objective, limited as to the kind of operations that are conducted, bombing or not bombing cities, limiting yourselves to the enemy's forces directly or something in between, limited as to the size and type of resources, and then how do you limit it?

Who agrees that it is going to be limited? Don't you have to have both sides in on an operation? I am not in any way suggesting a disagreement with you, because all my emotions and my instincts and all come out to meet what you are talking about I think.

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But when I try and put it down intellectually, I find a difficulty in this, and I find great difficulty in deciding how you decide where you end your preparation for a limited war, how large forces are and how much are you going to try and police the world in every capacity.

I wish you would talk a little bit about this, because these things I think have to be met in some fashion, otherwise we could agree in general but have no guide as to particulars.

General Taylor. You are quite right in suggesting that definitions are extremely important in these considerations and arguments over definitions have been almost interminable in military circles in the Pentagon.

General war is normally accepted in our discussions as being unlimited atomic war between the United States and probably some of its allies versus the Soviet Union and some of its allies.

It contemplates this international exchange which could well be said is not war at all but international suicide. Certainly this kind of war does not meet our historic concept of a war being an extension of political activities by other means. So here anything short of this general holocaust in my thinking is limited war.

Hence it accommodates a great variety of military operations different in size, different in objective, and differing in scope.

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The Korean War of course was a limited war under this definition. One of the great questions which arises when one contemplates all the vast gamut of possibilities in the limited war field is what about atomic weapons?

Will they play any part at all? That is very difficult to answer. Certainly I would say in the tense world where we have megaton weapons in both camps there is going to be great reluctance I think to use atomic weapons, even tactical small atomic weapons initially.

On the other hand, we cannot afford not to equip and organize our Army forces, our Marine forces particularly, with a view to their possible employment. So that it has been a problem with us who are responsible for these decisions to have what is called an either/or capability.

In other words, to fight with strictly conventional weapons or to utilize atomic weapons.

The danger of using atomic weapons in limited war growing to unlimited war as you imply is very great. No one can say that it may not develop in that way. The greater danger in my judgment is to become paralyzed by fear of general war to the point we will not meet boldly and resolutely these lesser challenges which certainly will be presented to us by the other fellow. So that a strong visible readiness to respond is an important part of our overall national deterrent posture.

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I am not at all sure I have answered all the points you are raising.

Senator Case. I think as far as anyone possibly could in the time, you have answered them and I think answered them extremely well. But the point, I think you come in the end to the point that I really wanted to make, that what we are talking about is not fighting a war but deterring it, limited as well as unlimited.

General Taylor. That is the great justification for all of our military efforts. They should all contribute to deterrence, but in general and limited war.

Senator Case. An aspect of that that you touched on in your book, and briefly in your statement, was this matter of bomb shelters.

General Taylor. Fall out shelters.

Senator Case. Yes, which I take it you do limit to shelters against fall out as opposed to blast or fire or the other effects.

How wide a program do you think is desirable in this area? Would it cover the whole population, would it cover civilians, individuals or industry or both, cities? Would you attempt to do anything about this, and would you comment particularly on the question on what it would look like in the world or how adverse an effect, if an adverse effect there would be, on our stature as a world power among our

bd73           allies as well as the enemy if we went into this thing in a big way?

General Taylor. All of those are very pertinent questions. In the first place I would say that we cannot afford a vast program nor should we suggest the nation live like moles in cellars. On the other hand, very light protective shelter, a little thought in the construction of our houses will give a very high percentage protection against fall out, which is the mass destroyer in case of atomic attack.

I don't think it would have adverse international effects. We know that the Soviets have been giving a great deal of thought and a considerable amount of construction in this field.

I would think it would simply indicate the seriousness of our preparation and our readiness to meet the enemy. It is convincing proof of our determination rather than a suggestion of timidity.

Senator Case. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Cannon?

Senator Cannon. General, it is really a pleasure to have you here before the committee. I think very highly of your ability and I know that you are doing a great service to our country in appearing here and giving us the benefit of your views.

Referring to your statement in paragraph 1 you state:

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"The placing of major reliance on weapons of massive destruction has lost all justification in view of Soviet progress in atomic weapons and long range missiles."

Now certainly if this situation did not keep the peace when we had a complete monopoly of atomic weapons, as we arrive nearer to a condition of atomic or nuclear parity, then it is much more less likely to act as an effective deterrent for small war type of operations that you referred to, is that true?

General Taylor. That is my point of view.

Senator Cannon. And certainly then if we directed our efforts toward only the position of obtaining nuclear parity where we thought we were deterring nuclear attack and had all our eggs so-called in one basket, we would be in a very unfortunate position indeed.

General Taylor. I agree.

Senator Cannon. Now in your second paragraph you stated "Meanwhile the trend of relative military strength is against us."

Now do you base that in part on the fact that we have consistently cut down our military forces, we have refused to take steps to adequately modernize the forces in accordance with the recommendations of our military leaders, and we have not proceeded at a rapid pace with the development of our missile capability?

bd75

General Taylor. We have had and have today a tremendous military strength represented in our manned bomber force, unfortunately I referred to it I believe correctly as a dwindling asset. Meanwhile we have not come along rapidly enough in the transition from bombers to truly effective missiles. I emphasize reliability, accuracy, effectiveness on the part of the missile system. Hence the advantage we had in the general war field is tending to disappear.

Meanwhile we have deliberately restrained our preparations to meet limited war. We have made no effort either to match in numbers or in qualities of equipment the known strength of the Soviets, so that in combination I think it is fair to say the trend is downward.

Senator Cannon. From your book and from the statements attributed to you, I am sure that there is no doubt in your mind but what there is a missile gap presently existing between us, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

General Taylor. If you will allow me to define missile gap as being something other than purely a difference in numbers of missiles, because the missile is really, it should be regarded as a part of a missile system which includes accuracy, reliability, early warning services, protective devices and so on.

Also relative exposure is a serious factor in so-called

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missile gaps.

So when I take the position that this is indeed a reality or soon will become one, I am thinking of all of those factors.

Senator Cannon. Now I note that you comment on the fact that our long-range missile force is limited in size and certainly reliability and immobile on exposed bases.

General, is there any doubt in your mind but what the Russians do have missile bases and concealed bases about which we know nothing at present?

General Taylor. I think it is fair to assume that. To say one knows it, I would be hesitant to say because there are so many gaps in our knowledge.

Senator Cannon. But it certainly is a reasonable assumption based on the information we do have available is that true?

General Taylor. It is.

Senator Cannon. I take it that it is one of your contentions, as brought out by your statement and your comments, that it is very important that we have disposal and/or mobility and concealment, sir, is that correct?

General Taylor. It is.

Senator Cannon. And we have nothing insofar as our missile posture is concerned because one can read every day in the papers every place that we have or will have missiles in the future?

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General Taylor. That is unfortunate.

Senator Cannon. Now General, you commented, you noted 3 steps that we could take to partially offset the missile gap, and you mentioned using Jupiter as a mobile field weapon as it was intended.

What is the status of the Jupiter at present?

General Taylor. I have not had a chance to check in the last 6 months exactly where the Jupiter is. The Army expended a tremendous effort in making this weapon operational. It was then turned over to the Air Force, and a squadron was organized at Huntsville with tremendous speed and effort. It had a very fine report on the squadron, however, there were great delays then in deciding where this weapon should go.

I am not sure whether we were making it available and I should say to some of our overseas allies, but meanwhile we were directed to take out the mobility feature so it had to be a fixed weapon. That apparently dampened the enthusiasm of our overseas allies and it has not moved yet. What the status of negotiations are now frankly I don't know.

Senator Cannon. And there is no doubt but this weapon has a great capability as a mobile weapon?

General Taylor. It is really the most reliable, the most tested weapon we have, because of that fact plus its potential mobility, it offers us a formal stopgap in this period.

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Senator Cannon. Now having had personal knowledge of your recognition of and interest in the problem of airlift since 1943, I wonder if you would comment on the problem of airlift insofar as the Army, your own field, is concerned?

General Taylor. Airlift is one aspect of the limited war problem. We will necessarily have most of our forces available for limited war in the United States.

There will be some in our overseas deployment, but the backbone of our strength will be home. The need to get to the spot threatened as rapidly as possible is very obvious. If we don't get there in time, the subsequent job may be much more difficult and much more costly. So that shortness of reaction time is one important aspect of limited war readiness. That means of course that our troops, large parts of them should move by air. An airlift should be organized like the fire department so there is a minimum time after ringing the bell before the planes get in the air. Hence we need quality, we need quantity and we need joint combined exercises to develop this capability.

Senator Cannon. Do you think that this problem has been exploited in the past? And when I say problem, do you think we have met the requirements that you have indicated we need?

General Taylor. I do not.

Senator Cannon. And would you recommend that we take

bd79 affirmative steps and in the immediate future, to remedy that?

General Taylor. It should be one of the steps included in our limited war measures.

Senator Cannon. Thank you.

Senator Wiley. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley.

Senator Wiley. I have to leave anyway. I heard you use that phrase "sterilize by fear". I got from that that you felt that America must see to it that from the standpoint of her thinking and her approach to this problem, she must not go off the deep end in her thinking and become not sterilized but paralyzed.

Now, you spoke about deterrence. You gave us the military deterrence. Are there other deterrents now that as an ex-military man and now, what are you, a businessman--

General Taylor. Of sorts.

Senator Wiley. Yes, of a sort. Peddling books, is that the idea?

General Taylor. No, sir. I am making light, hoping I can cast some light upon the world.

Senator Wiley. I am not inquiring as to what the return is on the book, you see, but this is the point that I want to drive at, because to me at least the matter of these other deterrents in the mind of Khrushchev is something he weighs.

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For instance, the attitude of 200 million Russian people. Do you think they want war?

General Taylor. No, sir.

Senator Wiley. What do you think of the attitude of the captive nations? Does he know their attitude, like Poland, what might happen if war came? Is that a deterrent?

General Taylor. Your point is the reluctance or abhorrence of war on the part of mankind?

Senator Wiley. I'm talking about the captive nations, using Poland as an illustration.

General Taylor. No nation wants war, sir.

Senator Wiley. Yes, but the effect upon his internal ability now. We are talking about someone that wants to let the balloon go up. What do you think of the effect of our allies, Europe, all our NATO. Do they constitute a deterrent?

General Taylor. Their strength is certainly a part of our strength, and depending upon their effectiveness they add to our deterrent strength.

Senator Wiley. Are there any other deterrents you can think of?

General Taylor. I go back to your first point which I think should be developed, namely that there is a moral aspect to deterrence on our part, that we have to present to the outside world the aspect of a cool calm determined nation, not going to be stampeded or paralyzed by fear.

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Senator Wiley. Have you any judgment at all as to how much the Russians and the Communists Chinese love each other?

General Taylor. I have nothing to contribute.

Senator Wiley. Do you think there is any danger there of a difference, and that that might have some deterrent proclivities?

General Taylor. It might but I have no evidence.

Senator Wiley. I might say that some years ago when one of the American newspapermen right after the war came over here, I was privileged to interrogate him, and I asked him about the line. He said that at that time the Kremlin was fortifying its line toward the Chinese, strengthening it.

Instead of taking down the forts they were increasing them, putting in Armed Forces.

What I am getting at now is your analysis of these deterrents that we have got to think about when we go ahead and make these additional deterrents in the military line.

Have you any other that you might think of?

General Taylor. No. I would certainly agree with you that deterrence is not strictly military, that there are moral and political aspects of great importance.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Weisl?

Mr. Weisl. General, in replying to Senator Johnson's question about the opportunity which you had to present your views to the National Security Council, I am sure you did not

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want to leave the impression that you were satisfied with the decisions or the answers that you got?

General Taylor. No.

Mr. Weisl. To your presentation?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Mr. Weisl. Because I want to put in the record some of the statements you have made in that connection, and I quote:

"In the National Security Council, the follow up is often defective."

And you further stated: "The National Security Council has not come to grips with the fundamental defense problem, and has failed to produce clearcut guidance for the Armed Forces". Is that correct?

General Taylor. Yes, in my judgment.

Mr. Weisl. In connection with the shelter program that we discussed, may I call your attention to the testimony before this committee of Governor Rockefeller?

He strongly urged that this country develop an extensive shelter program, pointing out that this was one of the main deterrents to an attack, because if the enemy believes that we have sufficient shelters to survive an attack, an extensive shelter program will be one of our principal deterrents.

Do you agree with Governor Rockefeller's view?

General Taylor. I certainly feel that it has a deterrent aspect. I am also impressed, however, by the fact that we

bd83            must balance our efforts in this field against those to obtain more direct military strength.

Mr. Weisl. And in that connection the Gaither report which we were denied access to, we talked to some of the members of the Gaither report, and they contended that they advocated a similar shelter program.

Now you testified before this committee on several occasions as to the vital urgent necessity of immediately trying to develop the Nike-Zeus, an antimissile missile system, and as a result of your testimony, the Congress appropriated \$137 million for end products or pre-production products, and also large sums for modernization of that research and development program.

Now none of the \$137 million has been used and a part of the modernization has not been used. Can you explain why that has happened, sir?

General Taylor. No, an active witness would be much more prepared to explain that. I have read of this and of course I consider it most regrettable that we have not pushed forward in modernization and Nike-Zeus field.

Mr. Weisl. What would happen if the Russians developed an antimissile missile before we did?

General Taylor. They would have a very important military and psychological advantage.

Mr. Weisl. That is all.

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Senator Stennis. I want to get back to something I mentioned a while ago just briefly, General.

I am not trying to take you out of your field, but it seems we all agree, government officials agree, both military and civilian, that we do have this missile gap.

I don't know of much -- we say the ICBMs -- I don't know of much that is being done about it in the way of trying to step up, really step up production of we will say the Atlas, which seems to be the foremost one.

Convair, which is the manufacturer of this missile, as I understand it they are just running along on a 40 hour week, one shift. I think that it could certainly be stepped up just as a practical proposition by doubling the shifts or working overtime. Now isn't that correct? I would advocate that that much could be done, and do it immediately.

General Taylor. Frankly I don't know the possibilities of increasing production. The Air Force experts had better give you testimony on that, sir.

Senator Stennis. It certainly makes common sense. You don't see any obstacle or anything of that kind in its path now, do you?

General Taylor. I don't know whether there are technical production problems.

Senator Stennis. Now getting back to the matter I was talking about a while ago, about the possibilities of having an

bd85 interchange of these rockets and boosters to keep them from having to finance, maintain and operate so many different systems, could you give us any suggestions along that line about the interchangeability of the rockets, of the parts of these various weapons?

General Taylor. No, thus far as you know, we have generally pioneered in this field.

There hasn't been much available overseas. I'm quite sure that is going to change. For example, the Army has been quite interested and has procured a number of French antitank missiles. We should have no pride in authorship, and if we find a foreign product which is good and ready, we should use it.

There is a great advantage in saving research and development costs. Our allies, I am sure, recognize that, and from their point of view have been utilizing our market quite extensively.

Senator Stennis. Getting it back here to home though, I am thinking about an interchangeability as between one weapons system and another or one rocket and another, and one missile and another after these reach the operational stage.

Couldn't there be some uniformity of boosters or parts?

General Taylor. At the time of the great argument over the future of the Jupiter missile, I proposed to the Secretary of Defense that we adopt the concept of a national arsenal.

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In other words, any service that has a good idea and a capability of producing a weapon should be allowed to go ahead and produce it.

Then it would be placed figuratively speaking into the national arsenal. Any user, any other service who has a need for it in the light of its roles and missions can reach into that arsenal, take it out and use it.

I still think it is a good concept and I believe that is what you have in mind.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Thinking somewhat in terms of that, I notice here the cost of the missiles alone, we are going to have quite a few of them operational, the cost of the missiles alone just for one year is astronomical already.

General Taylor. That is why it is so important to know now how much is enough. What is our goal? Why do we need 10 or why do we need 100 or 150 or whatever the number happens to be?

Senator Stennis. Yes. Well I can visualize one group of missiles for one type of missile costing 4 to 5 or 6, 7 or 8 billion dollars per year.

General Taylor, just to keep up. I mean that is based on actual figures, just to keep the supply line going and keep up the numbers.

That is just for one single missile as I say.

Now something must be done, we talk about planning four

bd87        years ahead, and that is necessary.

But it seems to me that something must be done now in planning ahead on a question of that kind.

Otherwise this cost is going to mushroom and become so astronomical that it can well undermine, really undermine the soundness of the free enterprise system.

General Taylor. The only encouraging factor from a fiscal point of view I would say is the fact we really don't need many of these if they are really good, if they are accurate and you are sure of getting on target.

In other words, the vastly increased warheads we have available reduces the actual number required, but it is up to us to decide what is the required number.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Well I think that is certainly a good comment there. But if we just keep on building and we are rather frantic about it now, these different types and kinds, 2 ICBMs now and intermediate range, and then of course you have to have battlefield and tactical, air to ground and ground to air and air to air and all, why as I say, it is going to run into many, many billions of dollars and I have a figure in mind where it could be just to supply the missile alone now, without the launching pads and the operations or anything else, to supply an annual crop you might say of these missiles would run anywhere from 5 to 8 or \$9 billion for one alone.

bd88

Do you know where we should go to try to impress someone with the idea of making plans now to use a fewer number of the types and all and therefore, reduce the cost?

General Taylor. I am afraid I will just repeat myself, Senator, and say my only solution is to make the military come up with an engineering kind of estimate of how much you need.

We are building our structure of defense without knowing what the factors of safety are. If you were an engineering company you would go broke operating on that basis.

Senator Stennis. You had a practical solution there of an arsenal.

General Taylor. I think it is a concept, sir, that gets away from the idea of the pride of ownership, that the Air Force or the Army will only fire a missile built, designed and so on by the Air Force, by the Army or by the Navy.

Senator Stennis. I yield to counsel.

Mr. Weisl. General Taylor, I omitted to advise you also that Governor Rockefeller in his testimony before this committee completely supported your position both on the budget and on the organization or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of staff system.

General Taylor. I am happy to hear it.

Senator Stennis. Senator Martin?

Senator Martin. General Taylor, in your colloquy with

d89

Senator Wiley you estimated I believe a new military budget or defense budget of about 50 to 55 billion per year for the next 5 years.

General Taylor. That was very much of a shotgun estimate, yes.

Senator Stennis. Was there any shelter provisions such as you discussed with Mr. Weisl a moment ago included in that budget?

General Taylor. No, it was not.

Senator Stennis. It is all military hardware and military personnel?

General Taylor. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. And did you attempt to break that increase in defense budget down by categories?

General Taylor. No, only very roughly, based upon experience in the past. I knew about what it would imply in terms of Army expenditure and applied corresponding factors to the other services.

Senator Stennis. Now in your colloquy with Senator Stennis on the matter of one ballistic missile, it was described by the Senator as possibly going to as much as 5 to 8 billion dollars. Did you have in mind that as included within your estimate of a 50 to \$55 billion budget?

General Taylor. No, sir. I don't know exactly the numbers and the missiles that Senator Stennis had in mind.

bd90

I did not specifically throw in an item of that nature, although the missile programs would be included.

Senator Stennis. Do you have at hand and available for us any approximation of the breakdown of your 10 to 15 billion dollar budget?

General Taylor. No, I did not, sir.

Again it was just an experience figure, and I emphasize it was really a shotgun estimate. I don't think it is too far off. Actually if we continue to spend at the same percentage of our gross national product as we are spending now, which is between 8 and 9%, we are going to be in this 50 to 55 billion area within say 3 or 4 years anyway.

Senator Martin. And any unusual or extreme increase in cost of a single missile or maybe 2 missiles would have to come in addition to your estimates then.

General Taylor. I would think if we really streamline our requirements, that is decide again how much is enough in terms of missiles on target, we are going to cut down the number of missiles which we need rather substantially.

I do think there will be other collateral expenses such as target acquisition and protection measures which would be added on top.

Senator Martin. That is an important point. You are looking for some saving by cutting down expenditures now being made to help hold that increase down to 10 to 15 billion dollars.

bd91

General Taylor. That is correct. I think there are excesses in our expenditures at the present time.

Senator Martin. That is all.

Senator Stennis. Senator Case?

Senator Case. No questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Senator Engle?

Senator Engle. No, thank you.

Senator Stennis. Senator Cannon?

Senator Cannon. General, do you take a parochial view toward our defense problem?

General Taylor. I really don't know what that means. The parish seems to be getting larger all the time.

Senator Engle. At least there is more people in it, let's put it that way.

Senator Stennis. General, would you like to make some other points? Maybe we have aroused your thinking on some point but didn't ask the specific question. Do you have something you would like to cover?

General Taylor. No, sir. I think the questioning has been very complete and I am very happy to have the chance to respond to your questions.

Senator Stennis. We certainly want to thank you, General, for coming here. I think you occupy, I know you occupy a very unique position following such a distinguished military career from the battlefield to the Chief of Staff of the Army and

bd92

having such fine practical knowledge and experience, and then to be willing to come here and really just take the bark off the tree and show us, go right down the line as you see these things, it is a very valuable service to the committee and I think to the American people.

Your testimony here as well as what you have said before is very impressive and I think very valuable, and I think the tree will bear fruit, not today or tomorrow but in the course of time as we have plans for the future.

We especially thank you.

General Taylor. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. I want to say too for the record I may not get to be here this afternoon. I could be away next week. I think we owe a special debt to Mr. Weisl and Mr. Vance here for their very fine services.

I'm sure the Chairman will express that, but I wanted to express it too.

Gentlemen, the committee will take a recess until 2 O'clock this afternoon at which time we will hear General Lemnitzer who is Chief of Staff of the Army, it will be an open session..

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the hearing was recessed until 2:00 p.m. of the same day.)

bd93

*Aero + Space*

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:10 p.m.

2/4/60  
(The following members are present: Senators Stennis,

Young, Cannon, Saltonstall, Wiley, Martin and Case.)

Senator Stennis. May we have quiet, please? The Committee will come to order. This afternoon we are very glad indeed to hear General Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, and then his testimony will conclude the hearings for this week.

General, the regular procedure here for our committee is to ask all our witnesses to be sworn.

Would you please stand? Do you solemnly swear that your testimony here will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Lemnitzer. I do.

Senator Stennis. General, as I have said, we are beset with considerable uncertainty this afternoon so far as rollcall votes are concerned, which means we may have several interruptions of your testimony, which will be unfortunate, but except for the inconvenience to you, it won't weaken your testimony one bit. We are especially glad to have you here, sir, and unless there is objection, do you have a prepared statement, General?

bd94

## TESTIMONY OF GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER

## ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

General Lemnitzer. No, I do not. I understood that the committee preferred not.

Senator Stennis. We are not expecting you to have one, so unless there is objection by the committee we will adopt now the usual procedure until changed by the committee, which is to allow the counsel 45 minutes to open the hearings and then we will proceed, each Senator, for 10 minutes.

Mr. Weisl?

Mr. Weisl. General Lemnitzer, may I call your attention to a review of the book that is published in a magazine called "The Army" in the February 1960 edition, and which magazine is published under the auspices of the Association of the United States Army, are you familiar with that?

General Lemnitzer. I am.

Mr. Weisl. This review is written by Mr. Herbert E. Stringer, who when he wrote this review was on the staff of the Army Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University. Are you familiar with the Army Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, I am.

Mr. Weisl. The Army uses that?

General Lemnitzer. A great deal.

Mr. Weisl. In a review of that book he stated as follows:

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And I quote:

"Our current ability to fight limited wars is in serious doubt according to Dr. Morgan Stern, and yet with a stalemate in nuclear arms, this is exactly the sort of situation which is most likely to develop. Here it is suggested because of our inability to cope with the limited wars which nibble away at territory and alliances, if we feel that success can be gained only by using nuclear and thermonuclear warheads, we may be the ones to bring on the big war. How ironic this would be if our nickle and dime economizing forced us into an all-out war because we didn't have the political guts to amply finance limited war forces. Since its inception, each year has seen cuts in the strategic Army corps, ignoring of pleas for adequate airlift, and little or no funds for modernizing the Army."

Would you care to comment on that statement?

General Lemnitzer. It is quite a broad statement, Mr. Weisl.

I don't know what the author means by our ability to fight limited war is in serious doubt. There is no doubt in my mind right now that we could do a very good job, probably not to the degree that some of us would like to be able to fight a limited war, but he seems to write our capability of fighting limited war completely off the field, and with this I do not agree.

bd96

We have a considerable capability of fighting limited war. There are certain areas in which I would like to see bolstered up, but on the whole I say we have a capability. Now your question or the statement raises the issue that the Army has been attempting to focus attention on for some period of time.

In the Army's efforts to focus attention on limited war, the unfortunate impression has been gained in a good many circles that the Army's role is limited to limited war, and with this I strongly disagree.

The Army has in my opinion the same capability to perform its applications in general war, limited war and indeed the cold war.

I feel strongly that the Army would be called upon to perform the same types of missions, probably differing in detail in a general war, in which there was a thermonuclear exchange. But after those exchanges, someone must go into the areas and gain control of land areas and the people who inhabit those areas. And that is the primary Army role and mission in war.

I don't think that there is much doubt about the Army being in the forefront of the capability and the type of forces that would be used in limited war. I think the role of the Army in cold war is all too frequently overlooked. I feel strongly that our deployments overseas at present play a vital

b697

role in the conduct of the cold war. Our forces in Germany, the Seventh United States Army with its five divisions, constitute a very important segment of the NATO shield forces. Our two divisions as a part of the United Nations Command in Korea are also a vital part of that force.

So on the whole I don't know what other questions are raised by that quotation that you made, but I have attempted to give my views on the general pattern of war. I would like to add this: In the Army's effort to focus attention on limited war, which has proven to be the most likely type of war since the close of World War II, there has also been the erroneous impression gained in many people's minds that the Army has been opposed to massive retaliation, retaliatory concept.

I have been rather closely associated with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1952, and I can say with personal knowledge that the Army has always supported, strongly supported, the building up of a retaliatory force as soon as we knew that our potential enemy had mastered the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

We regarded this and we agreed with the other services that this was a very vital part of the capability which we must have in the interest of our own security.

Mr. Weisl. Do you believe in the concept of an airborne alert?

General Lemnitzer. I believe in the concept of the

bd98  
airborne alert, but the problems that are raised in connection with it, and I have been following the hearings which have been held here and I know what the issues are, I believe in the concept of an airborne alert, but as to when to go on an airborne alert and how to go on it and the degree to which we do go on it are the issues, and I would prefer to discuss the details of those in executive session.

But I would like to make it clear right now that I am opposed to going on airborne alert under the circumstances and in the situation that exists today.

Mr. Weisl. But you are not speaking about the future?

General Lemnitzer. No, I am not speaking about the future.

Mr. Weisl. Do you agree with the principle enunciated by this book reviewer that if we neglect our limited war capabilities, we might start a nuclear war, be the cause of starting a nuclear war?

General Lemnitzer. I think it would be a very serious mistake to neglect our limited war capabilities. This I feel very strongly about. I feel that by having limited war, a limited war capability, and a good one, and the means to exercise that capability promptly is one of the very best ways I know of keeping a limited war limited and avoiding it getting out of hand and generating into something on the order of a general war.

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Mr. Weisl. We have had testimony by General Taylor and others that the Russian Army has been modernized twice since World War II, that it is highly mechanized, that it is highly mobile, that it has rockets, artillery, tanks, guns of a modern nature, and some witnesses, I refer specifically to General Gavin's testimony, that this equipment can outrank and outgun ours.

Would you care to comment on that?

General Lemnitzer. We do know that the Russian Army has been completely re-equipped with modern weapons at least once throughout its entire structure since World War II. The degree to which it has been re-equipped after that initial equipping with newer and more modern equipment than was used in World War II, I think cannot be dealt with by a general statement yes or no. I think in some cases they have been, in others they have not. They have high priority divisions just as we do, Mr. Weisl, and they are putting the emphasis on their high priority divisions.

Now when we get into the field of saying that they have rockets, missiles, artillery that can outrank us, in some cases I think this is a correct statement.

In others, I don't think it applies. I think you have to get down and make the comparison weapon by weapon to compare the characteristics of theirs vis a vis the characteristics of our own.

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Mr. Weisl. Would you like to discuss specifically those instances in open session or would you prefer to do that in closed?

General Lemnitzer. I would prefer to do it when we are discussing detailed characteristics because I think here I would be giving vital information to a potential enemy.

Mr. Weisl. In what areas do you believe that the limited war capabilities of the Army need bolstering?

General Lemnitzer. One of the principal problems confronting the Army is modernizing, and by that I don't want to give the impression that the Army does not have modern equipment, because it has. It has some excellent equipment. Some of its equipment is better than that I feel in the hands of the Soviet forces.

Our problem is in the field of the rate of modernization. Our research and development programs have developed in my opinion some of the finest military equipment that can be used in limited war. Our principal problem is to take those prototypes which have passed through the research, and development tests and evaluation tests and translate them into equipment in the hands of troops.

We are devoting the maximum part of the Army's budget that we can, and still maintain balance overall, to this end. But we do have good equipment in the hands of our forces, such as STRAC, and more new equipment coming out of our research and

bdl development that is particularly adapted for and usable in limited war.

Mr. Weisl. Congress last year added funds to the budget for the Army modernization. Are these funds being fully used?

General Lemnitzer. The answer to your question is no. I would like to tell you how the funds have been used so that it may be clear as to why I give the answer no. The total amount of money that was appropriated by the Congress over and above that which was in the 1960 budget amounted to 382.6 million dollars. Now 164.2 of these funds are being used to cover a deficiency in the funding of the fiscal year 1960 direct obligational program of the Department of the Army, which totaled about 1.372 billion. This deficiency resulted from the Office of Secretary of Defense Funding program as a result of assets which failed to materialize, but these assets were beyond the control of the Army to have any influence on it.

I might explain what I mean by that.

Under the Mutual Security Program, the Army provides some of its equipment right out of its inventory to assist our allies. We are normally reimbursed for that equipment so that we can replenish our inventories. The total amount of assets which we felt we should get did not materialize, and 164 million of the 382 were used to cover that particular deficit. \$43.4 million of the total of 382 will be used for modernization. This amount will be used to increase the Army's fiscal 1960

bd2

direct obligational program and it will be used in our so-called PEMA budget which is the Procurement of Equipment and Missiles Army. \$175 million of the 382 has been placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget for future contingencies. That gives the complete status of the total amount appropriated by the Congress in the Fiscal Year 1960 budget.

Senator Stennis. What was the last figure?

General Lemnitzer. \$175 million.

Mr. Weisl. Has been put in reserve?

General Lemnitzer. Has been placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget for future contingencies.

Mr. Weisl. Why hasn't the Bureau released that when it was the clear intent of Congress to use that money to modernize your Army?

General Lemnitzer. I can't answer that. You will have to ask the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. Weisl. Did you protest against the reserving of that money, not using it for modernization?

General Lemnitzer. We have requested on a number of occasions, but we have been informed of the decision and we accept it.

Mr. Weisl. Are you satisfied with the rate of modernization of the Army?

General Lemnitzer. No, I don't think it is normal for anyone in my particular position to be satisfied with the

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rate.

Mr. Weisl. I know that.

General Lemnitzer. And I would like to see the rate increased.

Mr. Weisl. Is it just because you would like to see it or is it because as the responsible Chief of Staff of the United States Army, you think it is urgent that it be increased?

General Lemnitzer. I would like to see the rate of modernization increased. I would like to have the most modern Army throughout the entire structure that our new resources that is the types of equipment which we have developed, will produce.

Mr. Weisl. Isn't it more than a statement that you would like to have it? Don't you feel that you ought to have it and that it is urgent that you have it?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, I think that is almost a synonymous statement. Certainly I'd like to have it because I think we need it.

Mr. Weisl. At our last hearing last year, when the 1960 Fiscal budget was presented, your predecessor, General Taylor, had certain reservations. Specifically he had reservations as to the speed of the Army modernization and the size of the Army modernization, and the antimissile missile Nike-Zeus program, the personnel strength of the active Army and reserve forces, and the Army's surface to air missile program.

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Those were his reservations. Those were his objections to the budget provided for the Army.

Would you like to comment on that?

General Lemnitzer. I will answer the question. I mentioned modernization generally already. We regard it as one of our most pressing problems. I understand the problems which are involved in making more resources available to the Army for this purpose. So I won't dwell any more on modernization.

It is a very important part of our program and what we are trying to do.

Mr. Weisl. Do you have reservations on Army modernization in fiscal budget 1961?

General Lemnitzer. I wouldn't express it as a reservation. We prepare a program. We submit it, and the people who have the responsibility of making the allocations of resources throughout the Defense Department have their problems to consider, and I accept the decisions that they have made with respect to modernization.

Mr. Weisl. I know that you accepted the decisions, but did the decisions meet your requirements?

General Lemnitzer. The decisions did not meet what we recommended, and I would say that we established the recommendation on the basis of what we thought was required.

Now with respect to the antimissile missile, this is a

bd5

very controversial subject. There are differing views on it. Insofar as the specific details are concerned, I think here again I would like to discuss the details in executive session.

I can say in open session here that the problems with our antimissile missile, the Nike-Zeus, is primarily in the field of technical problems, whether or not the Nike-Zeus can or cannot do certain things, whether it will meet all the requirements that Nike-Zeus is being brought along for. So it is in the technical field now that the primary differences of opinion prevail.

The scientists available to the Department of the Army and a great many of the scientists who have made evaluations have differing views on this, and those who have to make the decisions as to how fast to proceed with Nike-Zeus consulted them all and made the decisions on the basis of the overall recommendations.

Now I would like to shift to the military side of an antimissile missile.

I don't believe that anyone, anyone who has even the most elemental understanding of the problem of the ICBM era, I don't think anyone could not fail to comprehend the importance of having an effective antimissile missile such as the Nike-Zeus.

Now as to why this is important from a military point of view, except the obvious one that we would like to shoot

bd6

down as many incoming missiles if we are ever subjected to a missile attack, I think that is obvious.

The more detailed military reasons I would like to discuss in executive session. However, yesterday we had our fourth successful Nike-Zeus missile firing at White Sands, and it was a very successful one. It pertained only to the missile. I would not want to give the impression that I was talking about the entire Nike-Zeus weapons system. But this is a very, very gratifying thing to those of us in the Army and all the scientists and industrialists who are working on this problem.

So we are moving ahead.

I think I should say here in open session that Nike-Zeus is a going concern. The problem at present relates to how fast we shall go, and I would like to make it clear to the other members of the committee we are moving at the fastest possible speed in the research and development field. The differences of opinion which have arisen in the consideration of this, which is incidentally one of the most difficult technical problems ever undertaken by this or any other country, is whether or not we will move into the field of what we refer to as pre-production.

That is whether we should invest money now in developing the kinds of machines that can make some of the equipment which we presently know will be required to produce a Nike-Zeus

bd7 missile system.

Mr. Weisl. General, were the requirements that you recommended for the speedy development and researching of the Nike-Zeus complied with?

General Lemnitzer. I am not clear as to what you are after in this.

Mr. Weisl. I mean did you ask for more money than was given to you for the research and development of Nike-Zeus?

General Lemnitzer. I presume you are talking about the Fiscal 61 budget?

Mr. Weisl. Yes.

General Lemnitzer. The facts are that we asked for \$323 million for research and development. We had a total of \$287 million approved. In order that you may comprehend, however, what the difference is, the difference lies primarily in the field of training.

The authorities who, the proper authorities who made the decisions in this case, considered that inasmuch as we were not yet going into production or pre-production on Nike-Zeus, that funds should not properly be allocated at this time for training purposes.

Mr. Weisl. Did you agree with that?

General Lemnitzer. No, we recommended that we do go into the training field, because we thought that there could be a good many things learned in the early days of the program.

bd8

We could obtain valuable training information that would guide us in our later training which we would have to go into sooner or later.

Mr. Weisl. After the Congress heard or was aware of the need for the Nike-Zeus, in the fiscal budget of 1960, \$137 million was provided for those pre-production facilities, and we understand none of that money has been used, even though it has been appropriated.

General Lemnitzer. That \$157 million is in research and is a part of the \$175 million which I mentioned earlier.

Mr. Weisl. Why wasn't the \$137 million that was appropriated and recommended by the Army used?

General Lemnitzer. Because the decision was made not to go into preproduction.

Mr. Weisl. Do you agree with that decision?

General Lemnitzer. We recommended that we go into preproduction.

Senator Stennis. There is some confusion about these figures. Well, when you say \$137 million you mean the Nike-Zeus funds of \$137 million, is that correct?

Mr. Weisl. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. You disagreed with that decision?

General Lemnitzer. I prefer to put it on the basis that this is what we recommended. We believed in it.

Senator Stennis. Don't you think it is urgent and

bd9

essential or was urgent and essential that the money be used so that if you made the break through you would be ready to produce?

General Lemnitzer. If we didn't believe in it we would never have recommended it.

Mr. Weisl. You do believe in it now too?

General Lemnitzer. Yes.

Mr. Weisl. Have you requested that money be released?

General Lemnitzer. We have.

Mr. Weisl. Has that been denied?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, it has.

Mr. Weisl. By whom?

General Lemnitzer. We were informed by the Department of Defense.

Mr. Weisl. Would you consider it a most serious situation to the security of this country if the Russians could come up with an antimissile missile before we do?

General Lemnitzer. I would say it would be most serious, most serious.

Mr. Weisl. Would you care to discuss in open session whether the Russians have been working on an antimissile missile?

General Lemnitzer. I think I should discuss the details in closed session.

I would say this. I cannot believe that they are not

bd10

working on such a system.

Mr. Weisl. Do you believe in the same way that General Taylor testified, that the budget should be on a functional basis rather than on a vertical basis.

General Lemnitzer. I don't know what General Taylor testified. I know what you mean when you talk about the functional budget, and I would discuss it in terms -- since I don't know what General Taylor said, I would be prepared to answer you on what my understanding of what the functional budget is. My understanding is that the money would be allocated to functions within the Defense Department.

By that I mean there would be a certain percentage of the total defense budget would go to our massive retaliation function.

There would be another segment of it that would go to our air defense function, and so on. There are different people who break the functions down into different segments, but those two are quite clear, and I think illustrate what we are talking about.

We have looked at this in the Department of the Army and have felt that this would be a desirable approach, but there would have to be a considerable amount of overhaul and changing of our present fiscal procedures, the procedures particularly.

Now I believe since the Army originally raised this

bd11           question that there has been a number of steps that have been taken toward this end.

I believe both in the Defense Department, as a matter of fact indeed within the Army itself, that we are able now to give a better answer to how much money we are devoting to given functions. I am not advocating the overhauling of our fiscal procedures for the strict adoption of a functional budget. I would think that we would do well if we were proposing to move into this area, to take some clearcut area such as air defense, for example, and try it out, and then from the experience gained determine the size of it, the magnitude of the changes which would be involved in the governmental fiscal structure in order to attain the objectives.

Mr. Weisl. What is the 1961 fiscal budget based on a functional basis or on a vertical basis, so much for the Army, so much for the Navy, so much for the Air Force?

General Lemnitzer. It was broken down as is required by the Congress. Each service presents its own budget and was broken down Army, Navy and Air Force. But I do know that within the Defense Department they are able to indicate how much of the Army's budget goes to air defense, for example, and how much of the Air Force and Navy budget goes to the same function.

Mr. Weisl. And it was really done on a vertical basis

bd12

and not on a functional basis?

General Lemnitzer. Not strictly on a functional basis. It followed the pattern that fits our fiscal organization and procedures.

Mr. Weisl. General Taylor testified that one of the reasons for interservice rivalry and the battle for a slice of the pie was this: He said there is a budget ceiling fixed, and that each year after year the Budget Director or whoever it is, the Department of Defense says Air force gets 21%, Army gets 14%, Navy gets so much per cent. As a result of this, it causes this interservice struggle for funds for their individual services, and results in the loss of confidence by the public in the efficiency of the operations of the Devense Department.

Do you agree with that?

General Lemnitzer. In the first place, the percentages you mentioned are not correct.

Mr. Weisl. I didn't have them before me. But he said the percentages had been about the same each year.

General Lemnitzer. The percentages indeed have been the same for the past 5 or 6 years.

Mr. Weisl. Even though modern warfare crosses service lines.

General Lemnitzer. Yes, of course it crosses service lines, but I would like to say we have felt in the Army with

bd13        the changing pattern of warfare that the service percentage allocations that were proper in 1954 should vary to fit the technology and the developments in warfare, with special emphasis, as I pointed out before, the Army felt possibly that it could use and should have more in the field of raising our limited war capability.

Now this is our fiscal system, sir.

Each of the services have the organization and they are set up around the world to handle their fiscal procedures and prepare their budgets and also to implement those budgets as they are approved.

So if you are going to change that, you are going to have to change some of the basic structures not only of the Defense Department but of the individual services.

I would like to say I do not see for a moment why if each service makes an honest effort to get as much resources as it can to accomplish its assigned missions and functions, why it should then generate any loss of confidence in anybody's mind.

I feel that there is no difference involved here than there is in business. Everyone likes to have the best, the most effective and efficient organization that they can get. And so it is with those of us in the service.

I think we would run pretty poor organizations if we weren't pressing to get as much resource so that we could

bd14

have the best Army, Navy or Air Force.

I don't for a minute see why this should generate any lack of confidence in our military structure.

Mr. Weisl. I am sure that's so, and there was no intent to criticize the Army or the Air Force or the Navy for asking for as much as they could get.

General Lemnitzer. But the charge is frequently made, sir.

Mr. Weisl. General Taylor testified that the reason that the charge is frequently made is that when there is a difference of opinion among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to the statistics, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs usually decides in favor of that service from which he came, and he gave illustrations, which I won't repeat, with which you are undoubtedly familiar.

And he said the general public says, "Well, my God, if these fellows can't agree among themselves, and if the chairman who is supposed to be the arbitrator in most cases sides with the service from which he came, is that the right way of doing business or running any business?"

General Lemnitzer. There are a lot of ifs in that question, but I think I know what you are getting at.

The charge is made that there are differences of opinion in the Joint Chiefs, and indeed there are. I just don't see how any group of men that is confronted with the

bd15 complexities of our present military problem could fail to have differences of opinion. I am not so much concerned with differences of opinion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It will be a sorry day for this country when there aren't honest open differences of opinion.

Mr. Weisl. I am sure everyone agrees with that.

General Lemnitzer. But here again you get into the field where the Joint Chiefs are criticized for having differences of opinion on very far-reaching questions.

Mr. Weisl. Not at all.

General Lemnitzer. Yes, it is.

Mr. Weisl. Not as far as the committee is concerned. The criticism that was leveled was not leveled by us. It was leveled by General Taylor, your predecessor, and he said that the facts show that there have been so many split decisions where there was a difference of opinion, and that the evidence tended to show that the Chairman, who was supposed to be the arbitrator, in most cases decided with the service from which he came, and he produced statistics to prove that.

And he said that is the reason that a suspicion exists that the fellow is supposed to be the arbitrator and doesn't arbitrate but decides in favor of the service from which he came, and to which he goes back after he finishes his term with the Joint Chiefs.

bd16

General Lemnitzer. I am not sure you have stated the premise accurately. I don't regard the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the arbitrator. He is the presiding officer and he engages in the discussions with us. He like we have to fall back on his own experience. And I know that there are those who are advocating somewhat of a different system.

Someone makes the Chairman the final authority when there is a difference of opinion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With this I would not agree.

Mr. Weisl. This is what General Taylor says in his book:

"Thus, the Chairman has come to be a sort of party whip, charged with conveying the official line to the Chiefs, in the hope and expectations that they will be guided thereby in their actions. The debate usually became a heated dialogue between the Chairman and me", referring to himself, "in which neither succeeded in persuading the other."

General Lemnitzer. I would like to move it up to the present time and my own experience as Chief of Staff. I do not regard General Twining and I am sure he doesn't regard himself as I think you said the party whip.

Senator Wiley. Hear, hear.

Mr. Weisl. Those are the words that General Taylor used, not I.

General Lemnitzer. I don't regard General Twining and

bdl7

I'm sure he doesn't regard himself as the party whip.

Just what occurred during the period that General Taylor is referring to, I was not present and so I can't answer. It is definitely, however, not the situation that prevails today with General Twining as the Chairman.

Mr. Weisl. Who was the Chairman when General Taylor was there?

General Lemnitzer. Admiral Radford.

Mr. Weisl. Was General Twining also the chairman when General Taylor was there?

General Lemnitzer. For part of the time, yes.

Mr. Weisl. Then he cites 23 splits during the period in which General Taylor served, and in all those splits, the Army was supported 3 times and rejected 20 times. The Army didn't have a chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did they?

General Lemnitzer. Not during that period. The Army did have a chairman, General Bradley, General of the Army. Omar Bradley was the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Wiley. That really disproves the statement then. You said that Bradley and the rest of them whipped them into line.

Mr. Weisl. This wasn't Bradley. Bradley was not the chief.

Senator Wiley. I see.

Senator Stennis. Proceed.

bd18

General Lemnitzer. I'm sure that the record that you read in General Taylor's book is the correct record of the split papers and the way that decisions went.

I happen to have been with General Taylor during a part of that time, and it was of course disappointing and discouraging to us to have the record go this way. I think it is understandable.

Mr. Weisl. Yes. Now may I change the questioning a bit?

As you know the President on January 14 submitted to Congress a plan providing for the transfer of the development operations divisions of the Army Ballistic Agency to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

What is the Army's position concerning this transfer?

General Lemnitzer. I think I can give you the attitude of the Army on this transfer by reading --

Senator Stennis. Excuse me, counsel has used up his time. It appears to the Chair that this testimony and particularly this question we are coming to is of vital importance. It is new, and if we could just waive the rule as to him and let the general proceed.

Senator Young. May I give him the 10 minutes allotted to me?

Senator Stennis. All right. We perhaps had better follow the regular routine. Do you want to make a unanimous consent request?

bd20

Senator Young. I request that counsel may have my 10 minutes.

Senator Case. I object to that. I think counsel ought to have as much time as he needs.

Senator Stennis. Let him proceed indefinitely. All right, that will be done by unanimous consent. Thank you.

General Lemnitzer. I think the answer to your question can best be summed up in the press release which Secretary Brucker and I made on the 21st of October at the time the decision was announced, and I would like to read it.

"The President's decision to ask Congress to approve the transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's development operations division to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is intended to preserve this team as a national asset for the national good, and as such the Army wholeheartedly supports the decision. We will make every effort to effect the transfer as smoothly, efficiently and with as little disruption as we effected the transfer of the jet propulsion laboratory at Pasadena, California, from the Army to the Aeronautics and Space Administration early this year. The objective is to effect the transfer without losing a day in our important national space effort. At present there are very few details worked out, and we will collaborate closely with NASA and the Department of Defense to work them out as rapidly as possible."

bd21                    We have made great progress along that line since. Going  
on to the announcement:

"It is with a great deal of pride in the Army contribution to the nation's space effort that we turn over this portion of the Army ordnance missile command to NASA. Under NASA we are sure this magnificent and loyal group of men, headed by Dr. Werner Von Braun, will turn in many more firsts in the missile and space age to the credit of the United States and the free world."

Mr. Weisl. Thank you. Will the Army be able to continue to discharge its responsibilities in the development of its missile systems if the Development Operations Division of the Army Ballistic Agency is transferred to NASA?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, we feel that we will, and for this reason. In working out the cooperative agreement on which we made a great deal of progress, there are provisions which will make the Dr. Von Braun team or the development operations division available to the Army for such assistance as they can provide.

They will be responsive, still responsive not only to the Army's requirements, but to the Navy and Air Force as well, if they have any.

Mr. Weisl. Have any problems developed thus far in conjunction with this transfer to NASA? Has there been any disruption of Army programs and so forth?

bd22

General Lemnitzer. So far as I know, there hasn't been an hour's disruption.

Mr. Weisl. There is a resolution before the Congress proposing to make this transfer effective immediately.

Is it feasible to make actual transfer to NASA of all facilities, personnel and funds immediately?

General Lemnitzer. As we testified yesterday, it is not feasible to make the transfer effective immediately. Such a transfer involving so much millions of dollars and so many people, there are some 4200 involved, will require time and we have worked out a plan, which I am prepared to give this committee if they wish it, to effect a smooth, effective and efficient transfer, but the transfer will not be completed until about July 1. This is completely acceptable to the Department of the Army, Department of Defense and NASA. We feel that this is the logical way of doing it.

Now insofar as this particular legislation is concerned, there is one facet which is important. You are dealing with 4200 men and women at Huntsville, and as long as this legislation remains in the air, so to speak, and until Congress either goes along with the transfer in accordance with the President's recommendation or not, there is a degree of uncertainty in their minds as to where they stand.

In this respect, the earlier this matter is settled, the better.

bd23

From a practical viewpoint, the completion of the transfer, the phasing of all of this equipment and the change-over in management is going to take until about July 1 anyway.

Mr. Weisl. Then do you favor the resolution that has been introduced by the Congress to transfer these services immediately?

General Lemnitzer. In answer, Secretary Brucker and I testified yesterday we have no objection to it.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, when would the transfer be effective in the ordinary course, if no action were taken by Congress?

Mr. Weisl. March 13.

General Lemnitzer. March 14. But it is not so much the actual transfer. What I am trying to explain here is from the practical point of view the transfer cannot be made on any given date. It more or less will be in process over a period of days, weeks and months.

Senator Stennis. You refer to the physical transfer. What you would like to see though is to get the matter settled, so that the uncertainty will be removed?

General Lemnitzer. I would say that the settlement of this matter is important, from the viewpoint of the 4200 individuals who are involved. This great national asset -- there has been a great deal of uncertainty as to what is going

bd24           to happen to it, and I feel that the sooner the matter is settled as an issue, the better.

Mr. Weisl. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff make any recommendation on whether to proceed with the Nike-Zeus program?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Weisl. What was the recommendation?

General Lemnitzer. It was a split recommendation. The Army was for going ahead with the pre-production in Nike-Zeus. The other services were opposed.

Mr. Weisl. So it was 2 to one against it?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct.

Mr. Weisl. Was it the Secretary of Defense who froze the \$137 million for Nike-Zeus pre-production or the Bureau of the Budget?

General Lemnitzer. After having technical evaluations made by groups of scientists, after hearing our discussion and presentation and those of the other services, he decided not to go into production, and the funds were put in reserve.

Mr. Weisl. Who decided it?

General Lemnitzer. The Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Weisl. Thank you.

Senator Stennis. Apparently we are going to have a vote, but back on this matter of the transfer now, you spoke very eloquently, General, I thought, with reference to the

b25 wholehearted support of the Army in the transfer and also I was watching your words closely, you gave it your wholehearted support in future operations.

General Lemnitzer. Yes, sir.

Senator Stennis. Now you are pledging not only yourself and your present associates but you are pledging all the Army to just such a sentiment as that, is that correct?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Stennis. I commend you very highly because I know that this is not a small matter.

It has been in the debating stage for years within your circles. Now I have been there for the first time in the last 60 days, and as I get it now you have 4500 people, personnel, most of whom are located at Huntsville?

General Lemnitzer. And Cape Canaveral we have a few.

Senator Stennis. And the uncertainty that you refer to there is not a dissatisfaction, not any backbiting about it, but it is just to make certain what the situation is going to be where they are going to actually do the day's work, and items of that kind, is that correct?

General Lemnitzer. That's right.

It will settle what their futures are going to be.

Senator Stennis. Yes, and these are career people many of them are. Some are scientists and engineers and of that type.

bd26

Senator Stennis. I'm sorry, we will have to take a recess now for the purpose of going to vote.

We expect to return immediately and ask you some more questions.

(Short recess.)

Senator Stennis. May we have quiet please? I had asked just two or three questions and I shall certainly confine myself inside the total of 10 minutes and we will continue on then as rapidly as we can with the 10 minute limitation so as to get to the different Senators.

General, I had mentioned the transfer of authority and your very fine wholehearted support by the Army in the transfer and the wholehearted support in the operations, and you said you had pledged not only yourself but the Army as a group, and I commended you very highly for that.

You do not anticipate any entangling trouble in this transfer? The only thing you are concerned about now is just to make certain so that the personnel will understand where they are going and who they will be responsible to, and kindred matters?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct. We have a deep interest in the personal welfare and the future of this organization, every one of them.

Senator Stennis. If you will permit me to go just a little further, because in the Space Committee this time this project

bd27

will be involved in the authorization bill for the money on the Appropriations Committee. Of course those funds now will have to be authorized and appropriated in the NASA program.

Now is there going to be any involved complications there about certain supporting services that you have rendered heretofore, I mean that the Army has rendered heretofore to the project, and is there a clearcut dividing line established already for Fiscal 61 as to those funds?

General Lemnitzer. No, we don't think so, for the reason that in the cooperative agreement which we are working out in detail, and we have had experience in this regard since we transferred the jet propulsion laboratory -- so we do have this background of experience.

This cooperative agreement will provide for certain supporting services which the Army will provide Redstone, because there is no intention to move the facility or the people out of there.

Naturally the Army, since it runs the overall installation, will be called upon to provide certain services such as foundry services, perimeter security, utility services, and we have worked out an arrangement whereby they will reimburse us for the cost of those services.

Senator Stennis. So it won't involve cross lines in the appropriations under that plan?

bd28

General Lemnitzer. I don't think so.

Senator Stennis. There is some question about which service will occupy certain buildings down there. Have those matters been considered, and do you think they have been straightened out?

General Lemnitzer. I am sure they are. The main office building we are going to both occupy until NASA can make the arrangements which it desires.

Senator Stennis. All right, now about the airlift for the Army, it is a matter of concern to many, I am sure it is to you. I believe in quick striking power. I am a small war man in a way, because I think that those matters are going to vex us a long time, trouble spots, whether it is war or not, like Lebanon. I know there is a good deal of concern about your not having -- just what airlift do you have for your men and material on a quick call?

Do you have enough now, and is the arrangement satisfactory for you to take care of a division, we will say?

Would you hit the main points and then give your comment?

General Lemnitzer. Unless you define specifically the number of troops and the circumstances under which they would move and where they would move, you can't answer this categorically yes or no.

I would like to attempt to give a picture of where we stand in this regard.

bd29

The Army considers that emergencies can occur, possibly will occur which would require the economic movement of any of forces ranging from a battle group in the order of about 7 to 1500 or 1700 men to two divisions. This is the general magnitude of the problem. Now you have asked about a division. Our available airlift assets are distributed worldwide at present. If circumstances permitted an alert of these forces so that they could be concentrated where we wanted to lift our troops from, if we had ample warning, I believe that we could assemble -- I say we. It is the responsibility of the Air Force to provide this airlift.

I think the Air Force could assemble airlift to move the major part of the combatant elements of that division with its , with most of its equipment. There is certain types of equipment which we have in a division are too big for airlift and would come along following by sealift.

That is the first area of difficulty, whether we have this warning. If we don't have the warning, it is going to take time to assemble this aircraft. We feel in the Army that if we had more lift available, we would have greater flexibility, and we probably would have greater resources available here in the United States to move our forces, so this is the issue.

Senator Case. Would it be appropriate to ask the length of time required to assemble the aircraft?

bd30

General Lemnitzer. This would depend upon the number of aircraft that would have to be assembled for a division, I don't know. My estimate would be up to the order of up to a week, 5 days, to assemble the aircraft to lift a division, that is what I'm talking about now.

Senator Stennis. Tell us what you mean by being available? Does that mean standing by ready for that, or is it being used for something else and you have got to convert?

General Lemnitzer. It is being used for training purposes and we require a considerable amount for that, and they also have their training activities within the Air Force.

Now this is one of the troublesome points in this field, when an emergency arises which requires the movement, the rapid airlift of a division to a given area of the world, it normally generates other airlift requirements.

If the Army has to move some remote part of the world and go into combat, it needs air support. I am talking about reconnaissance, close air support, fighter bomber support.

What I am saying is that the tactical Air Force also has a considerable airlift requirement. And the if you do have an emergency which causes this kind of a movement to be required, you may have to want to regroup part of your strategic air command. They also should take up positions in readiness, depending upon the nature of the situation.

The very emergency which generates the requirement to

bd31            move Army forces requires simultaneously the requirement to  
move other forces.

Senator Stennis. Perhaps the Navy might call on you  
about the same time for some airlift.

General Lemnitzer. That is true. And I don't like to  
answer a question on that basis, but I am attempting here to  
show you the complicated nature of the problem, and if we  
had greater resources, we would have greater flexibilities,  
and we would have more assuredness that we would have the  
lift to move promptly the forces which we feel might be  
moved.

Senator Stennis. And then you can make your plans on how  
to anticipate various emergencies better, if you had this  
assurance?

General Lemnitzer. We do make these plans.

Senator Stennis. I know you do, but if you had more  
assurance of more airpower, it would give you a wider latitude  
in making plans.

General Lemnitzer. It would be a greater degree of our  
assuredness of our getting the airlift in the time that we  
would like to get it. Now I would like to say this. Our  
strategic Army Corps is ready for an immediate movement.  
By that I mean in the matter of an hour. The leading elements  
of our divisions that are on a standby basis, the 101st  
Airborne Division at Fort Campbell and the 82nd Airborne

bd32 Division at Fort Bragg, the Fourth Division at Fort Lewis, Washington have alert units which are ready to move in the matter of an hour.

Senator Saltonstall. Would the Senator yield for a question?

Senator Stennis. On the subject? Allright.

Senator Saltonstall. I think I know your answer, General, you don't want the Army to have a separate airlift of its own as opposed to the Air Force. You are satisfied with the present arrangement if you can get enough planes and get them quick enough, is that right?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct. The Army is definitely not recommending taking over the function of providing tactical and strategic airlift.

Senator Stennis. My time is virtually up. You may proceed on that same subject matter if you want to.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, that is the only question I wanted to ask. I have a few others, but will you finish?

Senator Stennis. On this airlift you have made this clearer than I have heard it before. There is no question of command here or anything of that kind. This would be air power that would be in the Air Force's control, but what you want is capacity, and assured capacity under most circumstances?

bd33

General Lemnitzer. We are interested in capacity. We are also interested in modernizing airlift. I guess the Army is for modernizing all of our Armed Forces but we are particularly interested in modernizing also. I think my description here would be incomplete if I didn't make this comment: The ideal situation from our viewpoint would be to have a given number of air units earmarked and readily available for an emergency upon which we knew we could count in case of an emergency.

Now the concept of handling of our airlift requirements for the reasons that I have just indicated is that the allocation of airlift to move, for example, the Strategic Army Corps, the Tactical Air Force, Strategic Air Command, the Navy or Marine Corps is held in a pool, and the allocation will be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or recommended to the Secretary of Defense on the basis of the situation then existing.

Now you can see that this puts an element of doubt in availability, depending upon the situation.

Senator Stennis. But now considering our worldwide commitments and in making your plans, you need the assurance that under most any circumstances you could get enough airlift to transfer at least a division, is that correct, a minimum of a division?

General Lemnitzer. We set our sights a bit higher.

bd34

From a battle group to 2 divisions is our estimate that we would feel better if we had that airlift available.

Senator Stennis. And you would want that to be available within a few hours or not over two days or just what period?

General Lemnitzer. A matter of days, a few days, the fewer the better.

Senator Stennis. May I illustrate? In the Lebanon situation the Army was up in North Italy, some of your units as I recall. They came down later and some 3 weeks later. Now that might have been a part of your plan in that case. But should it have been a part of the plan for the Army to go in there, you would have wanted that within a matter of hours in that case, would you not?

General Lemnitzer. We had it available in a matter of hours, and I would like to explain the situation, because many mistaken interpretations have been given to it that the Army did not arrive in there until a considerable period later.

The Army moved from Germany into Adana, Turkey, in a matter of hours, but the situation that developed upon the landing in Lebanon did not require their presence, but they were within a very few miles from the area, and if required they could have been moved right on in there in a matter of hours.

Senator Stennis. By airlift?

bd35

General Lemnitzer. By airlift.

Senator Stennis. All right. Senator Saltonstall?

Senator Saltonstall. General, I didn't hear all of your testimony this morning because I was listening to your co-partner, Admiral Burke of the Navy.

General Lemnitzer. General Taylor was on this morning. I am a newcomer. I arrived at 2 o'clock.

Senator Saltonstall. Let me ask you this following up what Senator Stennis asked, and then I have just one or two questions.

One thing that always made me uncertain about the airlift, of course the Army gives it a very high priority. The Air Force gives a lower priority. The Air Force as I understand will move their strategic, their SAC logistics before they expect the Army to be ready to move itself.

Now have you worked out any scheme or are you satisfied with the present arrangements there in case there is a general war that you would get sufficiently high priority in moving the division so that you would get it where you were ordered to go at a proper time?

General Lemnitzer. Under present concepts, we don't have a final answer on this. This will be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I should say this, however, within the Strategic Air Command, they have a certain amount of what refer to as organic airlift.

bd36

It is a part of the air wings. But whether or not their priority from available troop carrier and MATS type of air-lift was made available would also rest in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This would not be a unilateral decision made by the Strategic Air Command or indeed by the Air Force, because this whole pool will be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Saltonstall. So it is an overall decision of which the Army would be just one part?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct.

Senator Saltonstall. Now Mr. Vance tells me that you stated that you are satisfied with the new space set up, so I won't go into that.

I had that down to ask you.

General Lemnitzer. We so testified yesterday. We did not recommend this one, but I read the statement that Secretary Brucker and I put out at the time the decision was made, and we are supporting it wholeheartedly and we are expediting the transfer.

Senator Saltonstall. And are you satisfied with the budget arrangements and the position of Secretary Gates with relation to the Nike-Zeus?

General Lemnitzer. This question was discussed earlier here, sir.

Senator Saltonstall. I understand that it was.

bd37

General Lemnitzer. I explained that there is a difference of opinion on this. It is primarily in the field of technical evaluation of whether or not the Nike-Zeus is now ready to go into production or pre-production, getting ready for production.

This is where the area of controversy comes in. I pointed out that from a military point of view, and in the light of what has been discussed before this committee, the desirability of having an effective antimissile missile of the Nike-Zeus type, there can be no doubt about that from the military point of view.

So this decision, the Secretary heard the various evaluations made by groups of eminent scientists. There were differences of opinion within the scientists. He heard our views, those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he made the decision that we would not now go into preproduction as the Army recommended. And we accept that decision.

Senator Saltonstall. The problem that Senator Stennis and I and others on the Appropriations Committee face every year, as I see it, is to balance the top priorities between defensive weapons and the top rpriorities between offensive weapons, and the great problem is to decide how much to put into defense when we have got these overall problems of offense, of building up the Strategic Air Force, the missiles, the new procurement of the Army and so on.

bd38

That as then I see it is the overall problem that is concerned with the Nike-Zeus.

Do you agree with that?

General Lemnitzer. The statement of the problem, yes, I do. There are those who advocate devoting practically nothing for defense. I yield to no man in my interest in and advocacy of offense, but any offense, particularly with our philosophy and our general concept, democratic principles and so forth, I feel that under these circumstances we have to have sufficient defense to insure that we are not knocked out by a surprise attack.

So what I am saying is that of course, there must be a balance between offense and defense. We have to have a reasonable defense unless we are going to strike the first blow, which I don't think we are going to do. So we must have a reasonable defense in order to assure that we are not going to be overwhelmed by a surprise attack.

Senator Saltonstall. I will try to put this in this simple form, and maybe I oversimplify it. Are you satisfied as the Chief of Staff of the Army with the present method of making top decisions?

General Lemnitzer. With the present system and organization.

Senator Saltonstall. And the Chiefs of Staff and the setting up of an overall general in an area and those top drawer decisions?

bd39

General Lemnitzer. I am. I am. I think we have a decision making mechanism that can work and does work. I realize that there have been criticisms that we may have been slow in circumstances, and since I am a part of this decision-making mechanism, I should say that some of the decisions are not easy ones to make, and require a great deal of detailed and exhaustive study to be sure that we are making the right one, because in this business if you make a wrong decision, it may be irrevocable.

Senator Saltonstall. And you do not think that there is too much wasted time and wasted effort and too much indecision or too many people involved. I would say with a smile that I see your assistant has put a little prepared statement in front of you. If you want to read that into the record, we will be delighted to hear it.

General Lemnitzer. Those are my notes that I wrote up on this before I came up here, but I don't need to read them. Here we get into the matter of degree, most people are heartily in favor of a quick decision so long as it goes their way. I guess I am one of those. But I don't believe that this is an area of quick decisions at the national level.

You have to make quick decisions in the field, you have to make quick decisions in combat. But at the national level I think that these decisions can be handled by the mechanism which we have.

bd40

I would be the last one to say that this mechanism is functioning perfectly. I think we are improving it every day.

Senator Saltonstall. Listening to the Army last year, and listening to the Army this year, would you as the new Chief of Staff, the principal problem of the Army is so far as the Congress is concerned, threefold. One, the procurement of new weapons and sufficient funds.

Two, sufficient M&O to take care of your needs in your camps, shingling and care of equipment.

Three, the question as to whether we are going ahead fast enough with the Nike-Zeus. Those are the three principal problems that the Army is concerned with, am I correct?

General Lemnitzer. These are three of our principal problems, yes.

Senator Saltonstall. Those are top priority?

General Lemnitzer. The question of strength I would add to it, fortunately this year the Army is not being reduced in size, the active Army, and for this we are very happy.

Senator Saltonstall. And so far as organization or changing of organization and that sort of thing, in listening to you, you are satisfied with it?

General Lemnitzer. I am not satisfied entirely with it. I think this is a proper organization for this country. I think that improvements can be made in its functioning.

bd41

I think one of the best steps that have been made recently is the directive in which Secretary Gates is promptly informed of any differences of opinion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he sits in with us and discusses these problems, instead of permitting them to lie unsolved.

I think this is a very great step forward. I think what you are getting at, is the question of whether this reorganization which we went through as a result of legislation a year ago, whether we should change this organization.

I don't advocate it. I don't think that this organization has had an opportunity to shake down and function in all respects. It takes months and months to put together the joint staff which support the Joint Chiefs under their new responsibilities.

I would hope that there would be no attempts to reorganize until this one has been really tested and tried, and I think that we can do better than we are doing now and it is just a matter of time.

We have in the military, at least in my service, a saying that order, counterorder, order, disorder. I say in the field of reorganization, organize, reorganize and if you reorganize too much you get disorganization.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.  
I would ask one more question.

Senator Stennis. By unanimous consent you may.

bd42

Senator Saltonstall. Your former command if you will or responsibility was with foreign aid to a great degree. Now this year for the first time we have put the mutual assistance defense appropriation or military appropriations over in the defense budget.

But we have left them as I understand it as a separate appropriation, to come in as a separate appropriation and not to be included in the overall \$41,600,000,000 or whatever is the correct figure.

I would like from both your knowledge of the past and your present knowledge to inquire whether you think that is a good method?

If we are going to put mutual assistance defense into the military budget, should it not be included in the overall military expenditures and not be kept as a separate item about which the Congress can debate separately?

General Lemnitzer. The recommendation to have the military assistance side of the Mutual Security program transferred to the Defense Department was I believe a recommendation of the Draper Committee, and I agreed with it.

Now you are asking the question as to whether or not the money which is expended under the Military Assistance program should be included in the defense budget. I recommend against it for this reason: We have just been talking about the advantages of functional budgets, and I think it is very

bd43

much better that everyone, both in the Defense Department, in the Congress and throughout the country can see these two amounts in their proper perspective rather than to mix them up.

I think that we would have some of the same problems that we have and which were referred to here during the discussion of the functional budget. I think Mr. Weisl this is a good example, the functional budget on the Mutual Security side should be kept separate.

The money that is being expended by our own Armed Services, the Army, Navy and Air Force are separate entities and I so recommend.

Senator Stennis. Senator Young?

Senator Young. General, shortly before we recessed to answer a rollcall as I understood it, correct me if I am wrong, you testified that you would hate to see the time when there would not be differences of opinion expressed in the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I judge from that, that you do believe that it is desirable for military officials to develop and present their own ideas in the conference?

General Lemnitzer. I certainly do.

Senator Young. Reading in the New York Times of today a transcript of President Eisenhower's news conference on domestic and foreign matters, I note that in answer to a question of Roland Evans of the New York Herald Tribune,

bd44        the question is, so I don't take it out of context,  
I will read the question:

"Mr. President, you mentioned the word deterrent in your answer to that last question. Yesterday General Power said that our deterrent of heavy bombers cannot be properly safeguarded unless it is put on a full air alert. You discussed this with us before, but in view of General Power's testimony yesterday, would you give your view on that question?"

To which the President answered:

"No, there are too many of these Generals have all sorts of ideas."

Well, General, you don't concur in that view, do you, that too many Generals have all sorts of ideas?

General Lemnitzer. I think the problem here, Senator, is where you discuss these ideas and how and to whom they are presented.

Senator Young. Yes. Well, in other words, to put it more plainly, do you from your previous answers -- isn't it a fact that you do believe that differences of opinion among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that differences of opinion do not necessarily indicate parochial viewpoints? And May I say I am a humble fellow from Puckerbrush Township, Erie County, Ohio, and I wouldn't use the word parochial in that connection. I would probably use the word narrow or restricted. But regardless of that, will you

bd45           please answer my question?

General Lemnitzer. I am not quite sure what the question is.

Senator Young. The question was very plain, very plain. Do you believe that differences of opinion necessarily indicate parochial viewpoints?

General Lemnitzer. I feel that military officers should express to the proper authorities the views which they hold regarding the responsibilities which they hold. That is how I would answer that.

Senator Young. Coming right down, you said "That is how I would answer the question". So, General, coming right down to yourself, you do not consider military problems from a parochial standpoint, do you?

General Lemnitzer. I hope I do not, Senator.

Senator Young. That is all.

Senator Stennis. Thank you.

Senator Saltonstall. Would the Chairman yield for one observation, for clarification?

Senator Young. I don't have the floor. I surrendered the floor.

Senator Saltonstall. Would it be proper to add "with tact"?

Senator Stennis. Senator Wiley?

Senator Wiley. I want to compliment you, General.

bd46

I have listened with profit. See if I can briefly get what I think your position is.

As far as limited war is concerned, we are in an adequate position to take care of it.

General Lemnitzer. I couldn't answer the question in those terms. I think the test of time will determine our adequacy. I would say that we do have a considerably limited war capability, and I would like to emphasize here that this is not only an Army responsibility. It is a responsibility similarly of the Navy and the Air Force. I say that this country has a considerable limited war capability. In certain areas I would like to see our capabilities reenforced. We have discussed the influence of airlift on that. So I am not answering your question with respect to adequacy, because I think the real test of adequacy is in the future when we determine what we may get into.

Senator Wiley. Yes. It depends upon the size of the limited war, but we have demonstrated since the last war any time there was limited war we were there Johnny on the spot weren't we?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct.

Senator Wiley. Now, in relation to an all out war, there is a very serious question whether anybody or any nation is adequate, is that right?

General Lemnitzer. I think it is pretty well understood

bd47

that in the case of a general war in a thermonuclear exchange all nations will suffer heavily, very heavily.

Senator Wiley. Now what in your judgment has been the chief deterrent in relation to the Kremlin?

Why hasn't it shot the works?

General Lemnitzer. Well, I would not be in a position to answer that categorically, but I think one of the reasons is the strength of this country and our allies.

I am speaking of overall strength and I am not speaking only of military strength. I am speaking of economic strength, the determination to use our strength if it is challenged.

Senator Wiley. You mentioned allies. Do you think a matter of 200 million Russian people who don't want war figures in the matter at all in the minds of the leaders of the Kremlin, who constitute about 6 million out of the 200 million?

General Lemnitzer. I take it that you mean do the rank and file of the Russian people have the same influence on the decision to go to war that our people have?

Senator Wiley. Then there is the other problem --

General Lemnitzer. I merely asked a question. I am not sure what the question was. I understood your question to be as to whether I regarded the rank and file of the Russian people to have the same influence in this question of going to war that way the people in the free world do,

bd48

where most of the countries at least are democratic countries. Is that the question?

Senator Wiley. Well, that is one side of it. The other question is what influence the attitude of the Russian people now is, and we know that there is considerably more freedom than there was, and what the attitude of the people themselves would have as a deterrent.

General Lemnitzer. I am not able to evaluate the influence or the deterrent effect of the attitude of the Russian people.

As a general statement I don't think that in communist controlled areas that the influence of the people is as great at the national level as it is throughout the free world.

Senator Wiley. Do you think that they have the information as to what an all out war would mean to Russia?

General Lemnitzer. No, sir.

Senator Wiley. What do you think in the nature of a deterrent is the attitude of the so-called captive nations people? And I think there is 100 million of them. What I am trying to get at is a complete picture why we haven't gotten into a war and will the same thing operate to keep us out of a war, or will Khrushchev, for some reason or the other, let the balloon go up.

I want your judgement not only as a General but as a man

bd49 of good judgment outside the military who knows the facts of life.

General Lemnitzer. Well, I think there are a good many factors involved and my opinion is probably not worth any more than anyone else's in this regard, except I do feel that military strength is a very important factor, a very important factor.

I think the damage that might be done to what the Soviet Union has been attempting to do since the revolution in 1917, the destruction that would fall on all of their accomplishments to date to a degree the attitude of their people -- I happen personally to feel that the rank and file of the Russian people don't want war any more than any other people. I think it is a combination of all of these factors.

Senator Wiley. The combination of all of those plus the military deterrent that you mentioned creates in your opinion, does it, a real deterrent?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, I think it does.

Senator Wiley. Now considerable time was spent in relation to the differences between the Army, Navy, Air Force and Chief of Staff. As I understand it, you are men of independent judgment. You stick by your guns, and then after you have agreed on a conclusion, that is the conclusion of the group, is that it?

General Lemnitzer. No, I would state it in somewhat

bd50        different terms, our situation is that each of us present our honest frank opinions to our superiors. We argue our cases and points of view vigorously. We make the strongest possible presentations we can, but those in proper authority who have to make the decisions, having heard our presentations, have to make a decision.

And when they make a decision, we accept it and we carry it out and we do the very best we can with the resources that are made available to us.

Senator Wiley. You have accepted then the decision of those who have the overall decision to make?

General Lemnitzer. The overall responsibility to made these decisions, yes.

Senator Wiley. And then you play ball as a team?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, we do.

Senator Wiley. Now let's assume that you have, as you had some time ago in Lebanon-- for general rules let's take the Pacific. If you had a fracas there you would have some one who is the head of the Air and someone who is head of the Navy and someone who is head of the Army forces, but by and large there is an overall commander of the three, is there not?

General Lemnitzer. There is. Admiral Felt is Commander in Chief Pacific and under his command he has 3 components, Army, Navy and Air Force. I was the unified commander in the Far East from 1955 to 1957. I was commander in chief Far East

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and Commander In Chief United Nations Command and I also had three components. Any operations conducted in that area then or in the Pacific now would have been handled, would have been under my direction up until 1957, and would now be under the direction of Admiral Felt.

This is what we call a unified command.

Senator Wiley. In such a case you are all one team. You aren't 3 teams?

General Lemnitzer. Without a doubt.

Senator Wiley. And I think that is the thing that I want to get out to the country, so they don't get the idea that there is a disintegrating process in our Armed Services.

There is the same independence of thought there that you have on the floor of the Senate, and you know the Senators don't agree on everything. You notice that too, don't you?

General Lemnitzer. I have heard that, sir.

But in the Pacific I would like to say, or anywhere where we have a unified command, there is no such thing as a ground war, a Naval war or an Air war. In those unified command areas the services are mutually supported.

Senator Wiley. I think there is one thing that someone said to me we should bear in mind, and it will only take a minute or so. That nothing is static in life, and that includes the method of war.

The old war of a few years ago, the tactics and everything

bd52

have been changed. And as a result it has, from the standpoint of percentages, put the Army not in an inferior position, third instead of at one time the Army was first.

General Lemnitzer. I have never regarded services as being first, second and third. It depends entirely upon the task that has to be done.

In some instances there may be a greater requirement for Naval or Air Forces, others Army or Navy forces and so forth.

But the Mutual cooperation is required in modern warfare, and I heartily agree with you that things are not static. They are dynamic, and I don't believe that in the history of military forces there has been a greater revolution in technology than there has occurred in the last decade, and it is up to those of us who hold our positions as the heads of our respective services to change our organizations, our equipment, our tactics, our methods, our doctrines to meet those new and challenging requirements.

Senator Wiley. What I had in mind was not 1, 2, 3 but the figures show that you are at the lowest end of the cash, is that right?

General Lemnitzer. Yes. This has been the pattern for the last 7 or 8 years. I will say since the Korean War. Since then this has been the pattern.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. As I understand

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the necessities of modern technology and modern improvements and advancements bring about this unified command to which you refer, and that is definitely a part of your pattern now of operations?

General Lemnitzer. That is true, but this situation also occurred I would say, began during World War II, and during the Korean War.

Senator Stennis. It just strikes a layman that if this is so necessary in carrying on a war, then why in preparing for it is it so necessary to have separate services?

General Lemnitzer. Well, I think it would take some time to answer the question, but I still think that 3 separate services are highly desirable, you can have one service. This is possible. I think it has been tried in various nations in the past. It has never succeeded. I don't think it is the optimum way to deal with this problem of national security.

I think the division between the services is a perfectly natural one, one to fight on land, the Army; one to fight on the surface of the sea, over it and underneath it, the Navy; and in the air, the Air Force.

Senator Stennis. Why is it necessary to have a separate service? I was referring more to a unified command in all of this preparation than I was a totally unified service.

General Lemnitzer. But we do have unified commands. The basic concept of our present structure is the unified command

bd5554 system.

I would say it reaches the Washington level. The Defense Department is a unified command in every sense of the word, but that does not make valid the blending of the three services into a single whole.

I think that you are raising the problem of morale, tradition and all of these other intangible things.

Senator Stennis. What impresses us here is to try to consider and set a figure separately for the Navy, for the Army, for the Air Force. Now is the budget prepared on the basis of a unified command?

General Lemnitzer. Not strictly, but I don't believe if you had a single service you would eliminate any problem. I think if you had one service, you would still have the vexing and troublesome problems trying to decide how much for land warfare, how much going into our missile programs, O&M and so on. I think that the allocation within the total amount, the problem would still remain.

Senator Stennis. I don't want to infringe on Senator Cannon's time.

I will come back to this perhaps.

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Senator Cannon?

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## AFTERNOON SESSION

jt-1

Senator Cannon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, we know you are concerned about modernization of the Army, and, of course, as you know, Congress did earmark certain funds for use in modernization.

Now I understand that you have testified that the Army protested the decision of the Bureau of the Budget in withholding some of these funds that were earmarked for use in modernization, is that correct?

General Lemnitzer. I wouldn't use the word "protest". We asked for the funds. We made a strong case we felt for them. Our request was not approved, but we didn't I would say protest, complain.

Senator Cannon. You didn't complain. You just asked for them and didn't get them?

General Lemnitzer. That's right.

Senator Cannon. But at the time you asked for them, you felt they were very necessary, is that correct?

General Lemnitzer. We did.

Senator Cannon. Now do you believe that these funds are of such importance to our national security that new or perhaps stronger efforts should be made to dislodge these funds from the contingency fund?

General Lemnitzer. Well, of the funds that you referred to, Senator Cannon, only 175 remain available in reserve.

jt-2  
I think that is what you referred to.

We would like to get those funds. We have asked for them, and we probably will make another attempt to get them.

Senator Cannon. I don't think that quite answers my question, General. The question was do you think that these funds and the use for which they are intended are of such importance to the national security that new or perhaps stronger efforts should be made to dislodge these funds from the contingency fund? I am thinking of not only of your own efforts but efforts on behalf of the Congress.

General Lemnitzer. We need these funds for modernization of the Army, and as we have justified before various committees of the Congress, we have made a strong case for our modernization program. We need these funds.

Senator Cannon. And in your opinion they are very important to our national security?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, insofar as they will improve the capability of the Army to accomplish its mission, yes.

Senator Cannon. Now, General, assume that we go ahead for the next two or three years at the rate we are moving at the present time, now I am talking about our military programs, and recognizing the fact that Russia was the first to hit the moon, they may have more missiles than us, they have a more modern army, a more modernly equipped army, a larger army, a greater rate of economic growth, they will

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graduate some 2 and a half times more engineers this year than we do, do you have an opinion as to whether or not our relative positions would be the same two or three years from now?

General Lemnitzer. Well, if the premise is upon which you based your question materialized, obviously there will be a change in the relative positions. I am not clear that I get all the implications of your question.

Senator Cannon. The essence of the question is this. At the rate we now plan to progress for the next two or three years, and assuming these other factors which we know, is it your opinion that our relative position would still be the same at the end of say two or three years from now, or is there likely to be a greater difference in the present relative positions?

General Lemnitzer. Are you speaking solely of the military?

Senator Cannon. I am speaking solely of the military.

General Lemnitzer. Assuming that we carry out the programs that we have within -- I presume you are referring to some of the programs within the fiscal 1961 budget?

Senator Cannon. That is correct, General.

General Lemnitzer. I think in certain areas they will improve their positions vis-a-vis our own. In others we will.

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But regardless of those programs, I presume that the premise is that we will continue at about the rate that we have in our '61 budget, and they will go about the way they are going now.

Senator Cannon. That is correct.

General Lemnitzer. I feel that if these programs are carried out that we are talking about, that we will have the capability of deterring the Soviet Union from general war, and I believe that we will have a substantial capability of meeting any limited war within the period that you are talking about.

And if deterrence, if that degree of deterrence fails, that there isn't anything that the Soviet Union can do that will not bring massive destruction upon them during that particular period.

This is why I testified before the various committees of Congress that I have been before, and I believe we are reaching the era of mutual deterrence in the field of the types of big missiles, bomber aircraft and so forth that we have been talking about.

Senator Cannon. Then I take it that the summary of your statement there is that we would not necessarily have to proceed any faster than we are proceeding at the present time.

General Lemnitzer. If we proceed faster it would

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probably -- it would lower the risk. There is a certain amount of risk in this all the way along. This is true.

I don't believe that anyone can give a categoric answer on it as to what we should have done until the period has expired and we see what happens. That is the real test whether we have done enough or not.

Senator Cannon. And the reason, for example, that you ask for modernization in the Army is to attempt to lower that risk, to lessen the risk.

General Lemnitzer. To lessen that risk, yes.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Martin?

Senator Martin. General, the \$175 million we discussed earlier this afternoon that was placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget, was that the 1960 fiscal year funds?

General Lemnitzer. Fiscal 1960, that is correct.

Senator Martin. And there is some question about the funds for the fiscal year 1961 also?

General Lemnitzer. Well, this would be presently before the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate. I did not know and I hope that there is no possibility of them being cut.

Senator Martin. I did not mean cut by Congress. I got the impression that had been cut in process coming through from the Armed Services.

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General Lemnitzer. Well, only in this respect, Senator: that we submitted -- I think this is true for all services -- submitted requests for recommendations for funds over and above that which we got. This is correct.

Senator Martin. That is a perfectly normal function, at least as long as I have been aware of the functioning of the army and other armed forces. I believe that is customary to have each branch of the service recommend what they would desire for maximum efforts, and then of course that is scaled down from time to time by those higher up in the echelons of defense.

General Lemnitzer. We develop our plans on the basis of doing the best possible job and, usually, and it is normal, as you say, it is normal that the request that we make for funds be reduced to fit the over-all availability of resources, yes.

Senator Martin. I am not as worried about the cutting of requests before the grant but after they are appropriated by Congress to have then set aside in reserve, after you have more or less counted on having those funds available.

I am afraid sometimes the possible impact of that on certain projects. For instance, on Nike-Zeus. Do I understand that that might be slowed up a bit by this setting aside of funds in reserve?

General Lemnitzer. We would hope in the Nike-Zeus that

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we get the full \$287 million which we have asked for, because we feel very strongly since what we do in the field of Nike-Zeus is going to depend to a considerable extent upon the tests which we are presently setting up in the Pacific, any reduction of funds will stretch that test out, and we feel very strongly that we can't afford to loose a day in this budget.

Senator Martin. That is the cause of my concern exactly. Now will this placing in reserve of the \$175 million of the 1960 fiscal year funds slow up the Nike-Zeus development?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, in this sense. As I pointed out, \$137 million was appropriated by Congress to go into pre-production, to make the necessary arrangements to produce such things as transistors, which have to be produced in large quantity. We recommended this amount primarily for the purpose of saving time.

Senator Martin. The Nike-Zeus is still a part of the Air Defense Command, isn't it?

General Lemnitzer. There are no operational units yet for Nike-Zeus, but it is invisioned that Nike-Zeus most certainly will be employed by the Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense Command under his direction.

Senator Martin. Now the Air Defense Command is within your jurisdiction.

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General Lemnitzer. In my jurisdiction as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a unified command, Senator. It is under the command of General Kutter, and he has an Army, Navy and Air Force component that is very much like the rest of our unified command.

What I am saying is that it is not specifically within my area of responsibility as Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator Martin. Are the other functions of the Air Defense Command within your jurisdiction?

General Lemnitzer. No. I see what you are getting at.

The Army component of General Kutter's command comes within my particular area of responsibility. In other words, this is the surface to air missiles which are employed by the Army Air Defense Command, which is a component of the over-all, and this is our principle area of responsibility. The interceptor-side of the Air Defense Command, the warning side are functions of the other services.

Senator Martin. Now the functional approach that you described not long ago is illustrated here by pulling together all this Nike-Zeus for the different services into the operation of one command?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, I believe if we adopted a functional budget along the lines of a concept which has been expressed repeatedly, that the Nike-Zeus would come within the Air Defense. I presume at that time it would be made

jt-9 operational, and then it would not only be the Air Defense Command. It would be the Air and Missile Defense Command.

Senator Martin. Yes. You have a missile defense function. You have a Nike-Zeus special function. I am a little bit puzzled as to how far we take this functional approach.

General Lemnitzer. Well, maybe I can clear that up. The present title of the command is the Air Defense Command because up until the present time, and for some period in the future, the principle threat, as a matter of fact the only threat, has been the manned aircraft. That is why we call it the Air Defense Command.

At such time as we put operational units into it that are to shoot down missiles, it would be more properly titled the Air and Missile Defense Command.

Senator Martin. They are two separate functions there in that one package.

General Lemnitzer. That is right. That would seem to be reasonable to me, yes.

Senator Martin. You have quite different functions going after the missiles with the anti-missile missile than going after manned aircraft.

General Lemnitzer. The function is air missile defense, to defend this country and I will say they are pretty much parallel missions.

Senator Martin. Now looking ahead, have you made an

jt-10

estimate of your plans for your own command in its processing on up through the 1961 budget? Is that all completed?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, it is. We made our plans for fiscal year 1961. We based our budget on it and submitted it, and that is before the Congress now.

Senator Martin. And that has come through the budget?

General Lemnitzer. Through the Defense Department, through the Bureau of the Budget, and was presented in the President's Budget Message.

Senator Martin. This 175 million that was put in reserve, is that a part of the new budget or do you consider that a carry-over?

General Lemnitzer. If it is not released for use during this fiscal year, it will probably be carried over into the fiscal year 1961, and would thereby reduce the requirement for new funds for fiscal year 1961.

Senator Martin. If it is washed out, then you would have just a little larger need for the new year.

General Lemnitzer. This is right.

Senator Martin. That is, of course, the function here in Congress that we have had under discussion for some little time as to whether we should wash out and make all new for the year, or to let those stay as standing and take new ones and make them cumulative.

General Lemnitzer. I understand.

jt-11                    Senator Martin. All you care about is whether you get money to keep these projects going. I for one don't want to see the Nike-Zeus slowed up any. I saw enough of it in my tour last spring that I do not want to see that particular project slowed up. That is why I asked the question.

General Lemnitzer. Thank you, sir. We do not.

Senator Martin. That is all.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Weizl, we are back to you, sir.

CANT-2                Mr. Weizl. General Lemnitzer, we have in the record a chart showing that we have approximately 48 military commitments around the world. General Taylor testified that no requirements have been set out to meet those commitments. I want to ask you this question.

When we make a military commitment, are the military people consulted about it?

General Lemnitzer. Generally, yes.

Mr. Weizl. Always?

General Lemnitzer. I would say now they are. I can't say categorically that the 48 number is correct, and whether they were consulted in every instance. This I do not know. But I would say, generally speaking, I would say yes.

Some of these commitments may have grown out of other commitments or treaties that were not specifically initiated for military purposes.

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Mr. Weizl. Are the military asked whether they have or will have the resources to need those commitments?

General Lemnitzer. Not specifically in those terms, Mr. Weizl.

Mr. Weizl. In what terms are you asked?

General Lemnitzer. In the case of NATO, which is one of our principle military commitments, of course this is woven into the fabric of our 870 thousand strength for 1961, which we are talking about, our over-seas deployments, and indeed it goes through the whole fabric of the Army's plan and program for fiscal 1961.

Mr. Weizl. You are not saying that your 870 thousand strength is used for NATO, are you?

General Lemnitzer. No, but a substantial portion of it, nearly a third is used for NATO.

Mr. Weizl. Apart from NATO, are you consulted about these commitments around the world?

General Lemnitzer. Since I have been Chief-of-Staff, I know of none that we were not consulted about.

Mr. Weizl. Has there been any since you have been the Chief-of-Staff that you were not consulted about?

General Lemnitzer. Not that I know of.

Mr. Weizl. Would you know about them?

General Lemnitzer. Well, you don't know what you don't know about, and so I can't give you an authoritative answer.

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Mr. Weizl. Do you know about any that you were not consulted about?

General Lemnitzer. No, I do not.

Mr. Weizl. Do you have the capability today as meeting the 48 commitments that we have around the world?

General Lemnitzer. If we had to honor them all at one time, I think the answer is obviously no.

Mr. Weizl. How many could you honor at one time?

General Lemnitzer. It all depends on what they were.

Mr. Weizl. General Ridgway stated that we couldn't honor one limited war commitment.

General Lemnitzer. Well, I just don't believe it was stated quite in those terms, because a limited war -- we have, for example, I can envision a limited war requirement of say one battle group, and with a small air support, possibly small navy support. This we could honor.

Mr. Weizl. Could you honor a Korean War and a Taiwan War today, if it was limited?

General Lemnitzer. I will take the Korean War. I am more familiar with it. If there was an outbreak of hostilities in Korea, yes, we could.

Mr. Weizl. Suppose there was an outbreak of hostilities in Korea and some other place similar to Korea?

General Lemnitzer. This would present problems. I see what you are getting at. You are referring to the fact that

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crises are not likely to occur singly.

We may have several of them at the same time, and this is true, and this is the question that I raised during our air-lift discussions, and that also pertains to availability of forces, ready availability of forces. This is why we have reserves, however. This is why we have reserves, with the hope that we can meet more than one commitment at the same time.

Mr. Weizl. That is a hope.

General Lemnitzer. Well, it is a fact that up until a given point, and then you have got to spell it out in more precise detail.

Mr. Weizl. Do you wish to make any further statement about the position we would be in if there was a mutual nuclear deterrence, and we had to resort to limited war, considering our capabilities and our equipment and our divisions and our mechanization compared to China, Russia and the rest of the Soviet Nations.

General Lemnitzer. Well, as I indicated earlier in my testimony, I feel myself that we are well approaching the period when both the Communist and the Free World may have acquired a virtual and destructible nuclear capability.

If this is so, if this premise is so, and I happen to be one who feels that it is, I feel this renders more likely than as to the likelihood for limited-type wars.

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For this reason the Army is putting a great deal of emphasis, not the sole emphasis but a great deal of emphasis, on our readiness and preparation for limited war. It is fortunate that insofar as the Army is concerned, the forces which have the capability for limited war also have the good capability for general war.

So when this situation obtains, if it does, and I feel that it will, it could bring about what we have sometimes characterized as the equivalent of a strategic nuclear disarmament.

Therefore we feel we must always have as a vital part of our military power an invulnerable strategic nuclear deterrent, and then I feel that we must also have the type of forces to deal with the types of warfare less than general warfare.

And under such circumstances, it seems to me the most likely form of conflict may well involve the use of integrated land, sea and air forces in the modernized, yet basically traditional roles.

Mr. Weizl. And what we do today for modernization and mechanization and ability would determine what we would have when that time comes, if it does come. You can't make those decisions at a time when limited war comes, nor do we know when limited war will come. Isn't that true?

General Lemnitzer. This is correct. It may happen very

jt-16      quickly. But your comment about what the decisions made to-day not being applied until years ahead is definately true. Their decision today, as for example on the 1961 budget, will really provide the means for furnishing the men, manpower and equipment, the training several years in advance up to as far as 1962, 1963 or 1964, in some instances perhaps as late as 1965.

Mr. Weizl. And you consider it urgent that we make the decisions today, and not dilly-dally and wait until next year or the year after or the year after.

General Lemnitzer. Well, I think decisions are being made today, Mr. Weizl.

Mr. Weizl. I mean enough decisions. Of course decisions are being made, but Senator Cannon questioned you and tried to get you to answer these questions frankly.

General Lemnitzer. I attempted to answer them.

Mr. Weizl. I am sure you do want to answer them frankly.

General Lemnitzer. This is correct.

Mr. Weizl. I am not intimating that you don't. Are we getting enough modernization, enough mechanization, enough anti-missiles Zeus urgency and capability now, so that when, as and if when one of these wars come, we will have enough insurance to protect ourselves against it.

General Lemnitzer. As I pointed out, we would like to have more. We would like to have had more. We can do a

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better job with more people.

But in recognition of the over-all problem, I go back to what I have said before: that we are moving ahead, and I don't know of any decisions in my area of responsibility that have not been made. Now some of these decisions have been contrary to my recommendations, and that is what you are getting at.

Mr. Weizl. General, I know that in the area of your responsibility, you are doing everything that you can in that area with what you get to do it with.

What we are trying to find out is whether you get enough to do it. Enough to give this country protection, ample protection against being licked or having casualties or having more people killed than ought to be killed. That is the question we are trying to get. It isn't enough to say "I would like to get more".

General Lemnitzer. But what specific decision are you referring to?

Mr. Weizl. On modernization, on airlift, on national guard, on all of these problems.

General Lemnitzer. We have got decisions.

Mr. Weizl. I mean were the decisions sufficient to give you the satisfaction that you can do your job properly to protect the lives of our people, if limited war comes?

General Lemnitzer. As I pointed out before, the decisions

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were not what we wanted in every case. That is the best I can do.

Mr. Weizl. Very well.

Senator Stennis. General, there are a few more questions. Perhaps you don't understand why we go back to this modernization money so much, but I will give you a little background on that.

Last year before you became Chief-of-Staff, General Taylor made a very impressive statement before the Appropriations Committee. He had stated the same points prior thereto before the Armed Services Committee.

It was so impressive and so convincing that the Appropriations Committee, there is quite a round when they marked up the bill. The bill finally emerged with this extra money, and I know about the intensity of all of us.

I don't mean there were any gaggers out or anything like that, but it was touch and go there for days. Then the money was approved and emerged out of the conference, whatever difference there was.

It not only had this modernization of the Army, but it had the question -- and the date on it, there was the question -- of putting in something for the Air Lift. Well, the Air Lift was dropped out in the discussions.

Nike-Zeus was in this discussion, and it survived for this money that you mentioned. Modernization of the Navy was

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in all of these rounds in the Appropriations Committee. The extra money for missiles, particularly Atlas missiles and some other kinds of missiles, and finally settled on just missiles. That is the way it is written in the bill, that the President could transfer a great deal of this.

Mixed up in all of this was the carrier, the question of the carrier. The President had recommended one. There was the question on the nuclear carrier. Now the actual hard money survived for Nike-Zeus, and modernization of the Army, that particularly in your case.

General Lemnitzer. That is right.

Senator Stennis. Based upon this strong showing you made of the absolute necessity for it.

Now after all of that battle, why we come back here and make inquiry and you have been given only about \$36 million or some figure in that, rounded-out figure like that.

General Lemnitzer. 43, sir.

Senator Stennis. 43, and we had this up in the Armed Services Committee two or three days ago, and I thought the word came in after you were around there the next day, that this money had been released. Senator Russell thought that.

I am going into these details now to explain why we keep bringing this up. You need not check further as there is no conference necessary. Just let me finish my statement and it will all clear up.

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Senator Russell and I talked about it, that they released this money for modernization, and we were pleased about it.

Well, when you made the positive statement here this morning, I was satisfied that we were mistaken, we had gotten some wrong information, so I checked with him at noon, with Senator Russell, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and he went and called the staff and found that it had cleared the Department of Defense, according to our information.

But the Department of Defense had approved the release of this money for you, is that correct? Well, I will ask you the question later.

The information I have now is that it has cleared the Department of Defense, and now it is held up though by the Budget Bureau, and you don't have the money.

I am not stopping here, but my question is here we are, we were told all of these things, honestly told it, and we took your side and fought for the money and all of that, and now here all of these months later, if it was necessary and essential then, the facts haven't changed, why aren't you fighting harder for this money now?

General Lemnitzer. I think the confusion occurred for this reason. We were discussing the \$382 million which we have just discussed here.

Senator Stennis. Yes.

General Lemnitzer. The categorical statement was made that

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\$175 million was placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget.

As I recall the circumstances, Secretary Brucker was informed just before the conclusion of the meeting that we have placed a request for more modernization money, and it had cleared the Department of Defense to the tune of \$149 million.

Senator Stennis. Yes.

General Lemnitzer. 141.9.

Senator Stennis. Well, you can forget the figures. Just ram them out and let's go.

General Lemnitzer. This cleared the Defense Department. The next day when we were back, it had been approved by the Bureau of the Budget.

I think the confusion arose in the minds of many of us who were at that hearing that this 141.9 was a part of the 175 and I am told that it is not.

Senator Stennis. This is a different 140-odd million dollars there?

General Lemnitzer. This is correct.

Senator Stennis. I am not complaining about the confusion. I am complaining about the fact that this matter is held up now, and if it is so essential and so needed, as you said it was, and I know you were honest in it and are honest now, why can't something be done about it to get on with this job, this vital and essential job of modernizing your weapons?

As I said, I am a small war man or trouble-spot man. I

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believe that that is the way things are coming.

General Lemnitzer. There is no one more interested in getting this 175 million, Senator Stennis, than the Army. I would like to emphasize that. We want it. We need it.

But I also said that it was presently set aside, and we haven't gotten it. We may make another attempt.

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Senator Stennis. Senator Martin said this morning, I think we should studiously avoid staying out of technical decisions of the military, I mean the Senators. But we are told on other matters that you gentlemen recommend certain things and that is the assurance that the administration relies on you in those ways, and that makes the country safe.

Now here's a matter that we can understand. We don't know much about missiles, at least I don't, but here is something that I can understand, your need for the more modern rifles, more modern tanks and other essential ground-fighting equipment, and you urged on us, and I know you have been urging elsewhere, but still it is turned down.

It seems to me that that calls for an explanation by the administration, just to be told that you men are wrong and that this money is not needed.

General Lemnitzer. Senator, I know that you know what the procedures are and what the organization is for the funds.

Senator Stennis. I am not blaming you personally, but I think it is a very serious question involved here on a matter

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that everyone agrees on is so essential and so necessary.

General Lemnitzer. I think we have done the best we can on this matter. We may try again.

Senator Stennis. Well, you were just talking about these commitments so we have a probability of being called on from more than one place.

You just feel now that your ground army is not equipped to meet the situations, is that correct? That doesn't discount your army to say that, if you see it that way as to your weapon needs.

General Lemnitzer. We would be better equipped with this 175 million. I wouldn't want to give the impression to this Committee that the Army can't carry out certain commitments, because it can and will. We can do it better with more modern equipment, as I have attempted to state here this afternoon.

Senator Stennis. I know you would do your best, but it is just unthinkable that you would have to go up against better weapons than you have yourself.

Now with all the money that we spend, and I am not talking about the Army spending the money now, I mean with all the resources we have, the know-how, the technology and everything, it is just unthinkable that we would have to go up against someone else that had better weapons, better equipment, and therefore we would be at a disadvantage to that

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extent.

Now this money is available and appropriated, and the taxpayers have paid it in, you might say. Now just who is holding it up? Is it the Director of the Budget, Mr. Stans? That is where the funds are locked, is it not?

General Lemnitzer. I don't know who the individuals are, but it has been placed, the best information I can give you is that it has been placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget.

Senator Stennis. That is what I said. The Department of Defense approved it. That is correct, isn't it?

General Lemnitzer. Now we are getting mixed up on the two amounts of money again. We talked about the 175 that has been placed in reserve by the Bureau of the Budget.

What I have said is that the 141 million which causes the confusion before was approved by the Department of Defense, it has been now released by the Bureau of the Budget, but that 141 million is not a part of this 175 that is still in reserve.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, that is where your modernization money comes from, isn't it?

General Lemnitzer. This is true.

Senator Stennis. That is held in reserve.

General Lemnitzer. This is correct.

Senator Stennis. I just want to know where the money is.

jt-25           As I understand it, it is held up by the Civilian Bureau of the Budget, not the Bureau of the Budget of the Department of Defense but the President's Bureau of the Budget.

General Lemnitzer. By the Bureau of the Budget. We don't have one in the Department of Defense. That is the Comptroller.

Senator Stennis. I meant it is not held in any way there. Now do you know whether the President has personal knowledge of this matter or not? I doubt that he does.

General Lemnitzer. This I do not know, Senator.

Senator Stennis. You don't know about it?

General Lemnitzer. This I do not know.

Senator Stennis. I am not trying to raise the point that some mother's son is going out into battle unprepared. I don't try to put it that way.

But it is virtually a fact of life as I understand it, if you don't have these modern weapons with their fire-power and all of the new things that go to make them more effective and quicker in action and particularly the tanks that I know you have so high on your priority list, so it does leave us in that position, that we cannot give double assurance.

General Lemnitzer. Maybe I can explain the 175 million in terms which I know will be very understandable to you. If this \$175 million were released to the Army, as I understand it, it would require 175 million more in new obligational

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authority than is presently in the fiscal year 1960 budget.

Senator Stennis. In the 1960 budget, 1960 budget?

General Lemnitzer. In the 1961 budget. This is right.

Senator Stennis. Does that mean now that you can't spend the money --

General Lemnitzer. I am told by my budget advisor here that if this money was released, it would require \$175 million more in new obligational authority in the fiscal 1961 budget.

Senator Stennis. Now there are two interpretations to that that come to my mind. One is that if you release this 175 in order to judiciously spend it, you have got to have another 175 to put it in the proper kind of and effective programming.

The other possibility is that we just hold this money until the next budget year, and then we will spend it and thereby hold down the 1961 budget that much for something that is needed now.

Now which is the correct interpretation of those, General.

General Lemnitzer. The latter.

Senator Stennis. The latter?

General Lemnitzer. That is right.

Senator Stennis. Alright, that means then that there is an admitted, known and urgent need that you have recognized, that the Congress has recognized, the money has been put up, but never the less it is being delayed until next year, the

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next fiscal year, is that correct?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. Well, it is a very sad fact, it seems to me, particularly when it pertains to these elemental, fundamental and essential weapons, many of which you have put in the hands of the individual soldiers, isn't that correct?

General Lemnitzer. It includes those, yes.

Senator Stennis. It includes those, and then it includes tanks?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, there would be tanks with part of this money.

Senator Stennis. These battle-field helicopters and these little planes that impressed me so much, are they in there too?

General Lemnitzer. Some of them.

Senator Stennis. Well I am really surprised to see these facts hanging here just as they are. I think, if I may suggest it, it seems to me, General, that even though you have done your best so far, that you are under obligation, especially to continue to press for this essential and needed money for these particular purposes, and I hope that you do, and I believe you certainly have the backing of the Committee that knows about these facts, and I believe the entire Congress.

I just think it is your duty to press forward in every way that you possibly can. I thank you very much for your

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very complete explanation of it.

General Lemnitzer. I thank you.

Senator Stennis. I have one other question. Senator Cannon, you are next.

Senator Cannon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions. I just want to make an observation.

I appreciate very much the Chairman developing this thought, because it was the thing I was trying to get at earlier in questioning the General, and the Chairman has brought it out in a very fine manner.

I say this: that I think it is a very serious matter to be concerned about when we find that the military part of this country is being determined by the Bureau of the Budget and not by the people who are charged with that responsibility.

This bears out what the General has testified to now, it bears out the testimony that we received this morning, that these guidelines are laid down and actually are military things that are determined by the Bureau of the Budget and the lines that are set through the Executive Department.

I just go back to the testimony that was presented to this Committee yesterday wherein some of the problems involving the military end were explained to this Committee, and the witness stated that the fault was not with the legislative branch in the slow-up of a lot of these programs, but the

jt-29            fault was that we had too many people in the Executive Branch of the Government, and I certainly subscribe to that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Stennis. Thank you, Senator. Senator Martin?

Senator Martin. General Lemnitzer, you have brought us some very valuable information, and I do admire your attitude throughout. I think you have tried to give us a picture of what you think you need, and you have taken what you can get in the right spirit, and you will continue your efforts to get what you think you need.

General Lemnitzer. Thank you, sir.

Senator Stennis. May I add too to what Senator Martin and Senator Cannon have said. This gives us a very direct relation and contact with the problem that you are up against, and gives us a better understanding of what your efforts mean and how frustrating it is to you.

I commend you very highly for the fight that you are making, you, and your staff and others, and I certainly hope that you press forward on this matter and get this program started.

Now I have one or two other questions here. You spoke of a possibility of explaining something further in executive session. Was there something that you wished to bring up in Executive Session, General?

General Lemnitzer. No. I thought that perhaps the

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Committee might want to bring it up and develop it further, but no --

Senator Stennis. What was that point? We had discussed one thing --

General Lemnitzer. There were two points, on the air lift and the other one was on the Nike-Zeus.

Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, I would very gladly like to hear you further on either of those.

May I ask you this. Can you tell us in open session about the development of the pushing of missiles? As I recall, that is one that you have emphasis on in your thinking, and do you find any restrictions on a speedy development?

General Lemnitzer. We regard Pershing as one of our most important missiles. It will be the field army's support missile.

It will take the place of our first large missile, the Red Stone, but it will have the advantage of being much smaller, much more responsive in that it uses solid propellants, and it will give us some of the range, some additional range over that of the Red Stone missile.

It is one of our highest priority projects. It is moving on schedule, and we aim to keep it that way.

It is being developed, as you know, by the Martin Company and we are looking forward to getting this into the hands of our Red Stone units to replace that rather large and bulky

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missile, but still a good one, that will provide a much better field army support weapon.

Senator Stennis. This is the situation where you already have the squadrons, you have the field training behind and the crews ready, I call it crews, I don't know what you call it. You just want to supply them with this battle-type missile?

General Lemnitzer. This is right.

Senator Stennis. Alright. Now do you have this in production? I don't know.

General Lemnitzer. No, it is not. It is still in the research and development stage, and it will soon move into the test and evaluation stage.

I think you were getting at the problem that we faced some years ago, Senator Stennis, on being restricted to 200 mile range.

Senator Stennis. Yes.

General Lemnitzer. This is what you referred to. When Secretary McElroy authorized the Army to proceed with the Pershing Missile as the replacement for the program, there were only two limitations put on it, that it was not to exceed 10,000 pounds in weight, that is to give it mobility in the field, and that it use solid propellants.

Senator Martin. What was that last point?

General Lemnitzer. And it use solid propellants.

jt-32                    Senator Stennis. That is the Pershing that you are talking about?

General Lemnitzer. That is correct.

Senator Stennis. Now you are already in the development stage?

General Lemnitzer. Yes, we are. We expect to launch the initial prototypes of Pershing in the not-too-distant future. As a matter of fact, some of the construction at Cape Canaveral is being developed along that line.

Senator Stennis. This is in line with the ultimate in your ground weapons in being ready to the end on that level. This is the one that you are relying upon, is it, the Pershing?

General Lemnitzer. This will be our longest range missile, and put us in a much more favorable position to deal with an enemy which has missiles that outranges presently the Red Stone.

Senator Stennis. Well, I think it is so vital to have what I call these battlefield missiles. That is the way I describe them.

Does this 10,000 pound limitation -- is that proving a hindrance to you or what?

General Lemnitzer. No, it is not.

Senator Stennis. So it is working out alright on that scale?

General Lemnitzer. So far it has.

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Senator Stennis. Could you tell us what pounds are involved?

General Lemnitzer. Well, we are going right up to the 10,000 pounds, and we are attempting to squeeze every yard of range out of that that we can, and it will be considerably more than that of the Red Stone.

Senator Stennis. Before we have an Executive Session, let's see if there is anything else. Alright, we will have to ask our visitors now, even though we have been glad to have you here, to retire please. We will have a short Executive Session.

(Whereupon at 5:10 p. m. the Committee went into Executive Session.)

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